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Executive summary  
Background 
This report for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (the Commission) 
examines the threats to information privacy that have emerged in recent years, 
focusing on the activities of the state. It argues that current privacy laws and 
regulation do not adequately uphold human rights, and that fundamental reform is 
required. It identifies two principal areas of concern: the state’s handling of personal 
data, and the use of surveillance by public bodies.  
 
Privacy concepts have a long tradition in Britain and can be traced back in common 
law and, more recently, appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today, 
the right to privacy is contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), and is incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act (HRA) 
1998. As a statutory body, the Commission has a duty to encourage compliance with 
the HRA and other human rights obligations under international treaties. 
 
Developments in information technology and the purposes of state policy and the 
private sector mean that we are now more vulnerable than ever to unwanted 
surveillance. There is a growing demand for personal information from both the 
public and private sectors. New technology allows organisations to store, analyse 
and share such information in increasingly complex ways. Although recent legislation 
has attempted to strengthen information privacy, the law has not kept pace with 
changes in technology and in the uses to which it is put.  
 
As a result, evidence suggests that the state is failing adequately to uphold the right 
to privacy. There has been widespread concern regarding the expansion of 
government databases and the processing of personal data. The Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, which governs the use of surveillance by the 
police, local authorities and other public bodies, is marred by ambiguity, leaving open 
the possibility of serious errors, inadvertent use of illegal surveillance techniques, and 
inappropriate use of surveillance powers. Surveillance is increasingly becoming a 
feature of everyday life in areas we previously considered private. There are 
concerns about the proliferation of CCTV and its lack of regulation, as well as about 
the potentially chilling effects of surveillance on, for example, peaceful protest. It is 
little wonder, in this context, that privacy has become a key public concern.  
 
Overall finding 
The central finding of this report is that the existing approach to the protection of 
information privacy in the UK is fundamentally flawed, and that there is a pressing 
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need for widespread legislative reform in order to ensure that the rights contained in 
Article 8 are respected.  The report argues for the establishment of a number of key 
‘privacy principles’ that can be used to guide future legal reforms and the 
development of sector-specific regulation. 
 
Key findings 
• The privacy landscape has been transformed in recent years by a series of 
landmark legislative reforms, including the HRA, the DPAs of 1984 and 1998, and 
RIPA. 
 
• There has also been a dramatic increase in the amount of personal information 
held by the public sector, due to technological developments and a steady 
expansion of the role of the state. 
 
• The current system has a weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy. 
Acts such as the DPA and RIPA are riddled with gaps and contradictions, and are 
also interpreted, administered and overseen by a range of separate regulators, 
independent tribunals, and courts. As a consequence, it has become very difficult 
for individuals to understand what happens to their personal information, or what 
they should do when that information is misused. The current system has failed to 
protect privacy rights in a number of cases.  
 
• The problem is likely to become more acute. The state’s demands for personal 
information will continue to grow in relation to national security, law enforcement 
and citizens’ access to public services. So far, this expansion has been 
accompanied by only a relatively small increase in the powers or resources 
available to regulatory authorities such as the Information Commissioner’s Office 
or the various Commissioners in the field of surveillance.  
  
• A more flexible, comprehensive approach to privacy is needed, based on a firm 
commitment to Article 8 of the ECHR. This involves reforming the law and the 
regulatory system to create a comprehensive privacy protection regime to 
supersede the piecemeal inventory of measures or ‘tools’ implemented in a 
disjointed fashion by various agents. The relevant regulatory agencies need to be 
strengthened. 
 
• Law is essential: without legal specification of privacy rights, other instruments are 
likely to be incapable of providing the remedies that individuals may need. The 
law needs to be flexible enough to respond to the many and varied threats to 
privacy. 
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• The principles written into law or underpinning it must be reflected in the 
specification of other instruments. These are seen as reinforcements and 
complements to the law and not as substitutes for, or weaker versions of, privacy 
laws. 
 
• There are many ways of protecting privacy in addition to legal provisions, 
including self-regulatory approaches, 'privacy-enhancing technologies', ‘privacy by 
design’, and public awareness and education. Such complementary, non-legal 
approaches to the protection of information privacy have an important part to play 
in upholding information privacy rights. 
 
Recommendations 
This report makes four main recommendations: 
 
(1) A clear set of ‘privacy principles’ should be developed and used as the basis for 
future legislation, and to guide the decisions of regulators and government 
agencies concerned with information privacy and data collection in different 
contexts. 
 
(2) Existing legislation that touches on privacy should be reformed to ensure that it 
is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that it 
enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At 
minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and 
data protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance.  
 
(3) Greater regulatory coherence should be promoted. There should be an effort to 
rationalise and consolidate the current approach to the regulation of 
surveillance and data collection in the UK, with particular attention paid to the 
relationship between the various statutory Commissioners responsible for 
protecting information privacy. 
 
(4) Improved technological, organisational, and other means of protection should 
play an integral part in information privacy protection. The development and use 
of technological and non-legal solutions to the problem of information privacy 
protection should be encouraged by government, and more resources devoted 
to public education and awareness around privacy.  
 
The right to privacy is at risk of being eroded by the growing demand for information 
by government and the private sector. Unless we start to reform the law and build a 
regulatory system capable of protecting information privacy, we may soon find that it 
is a thing of the past. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Privacy has a long history in Britain. Concepts related to privacy can be traced back 
in the common law and, more recently, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1984 first developed statutory protections for 
information privacy. Under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), everyone has the ‘right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence’. Incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 
(HRA) 1998, Article 8 now provides an overarching framework for the protection of 
privacy in the UK, as well as a set of principles that can be used to guide the 
development of privacy and data protection laws in this country.  
 
Yet despite the fact that there is now a clear right to privacy in the UK, over the past 
10 years that right has come under increasing pressure from the state. Although the 
spread of public space CCTV and the introduction of full body scanners in airports 
such as Heathrow and Manchester are among the more visible signs of this ‘assault 
on privacy’, increasingly the threat comes from the day-to-day work of government 
departments, public bodies, and local authorities. As the state collects more and 
more information about its citizens, and as developments in technology make it 
easier to process and share this information, there is a danger that the protections 
provided by Article 8 and existing UK data protection laws will be gradually eroded.  
 
In recent years, the proliferation of government databases, a number of high-profile 
data losses and examples of over-zealous police and local authority surveillance 
have helped to highlight the threat to privacy posed by the state. The National DNA 
database was found to be unlawful in the case of In S. & Marper v United Kingdom 
where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the system of 
indefinite retention of DNA samples, profiles and fingerprints of those who had not 
been convicted of a crime breached Article 8 privacy rights. The Government is 
currently proposing changes to the database. In recent years, widespread public 
concern has been raised regarding proposals for other databases, not least that of a 
national identity database. 
 
In November 2007, the Government revealed that Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) had lost a computer disc containing the child benefit records of 
over 25 million people.1 Less than a month later, the Government then disclosed that 
a computer hard drive had also gone missing in the USA, this time with the personal 
details of some three million UK learner drivers. Speaking to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution in the wake of these revelations, the then 
Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, observed that such losses had not only 
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damaged public confidence in the Government’s ability to handle sensitive 
information, but had also raised serious concerns about the protection of information 
privacy in the UK: 
 
Concerns are increasing … We know now that something like nine out of 
ten people ... have concerns about the security of their personal 
information ... [and] 60 per cent are saying that they feel they have lost 
control over the way in which their personal information is being used.2 
 
Controversy has also arisen over the growing use of covert surveillance tactics in the 
UK, not only by the police, but also by local authorities and other public bodies and 
the adequacy of the oversight regime of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA). According to a report published by Big Brother Watch in May 2010, in the last 
two years 372 local authorities have made use of surveillance powers contained in 
RIPA 2000, and have between them carried out over 8,500 separate surveillance 
operations (Big Brother Watch, 2010; Travis, 2010). Not only have these powers 
been used to prevent dog fouling, fly tipping, and to ensure that government 
employees do not abuse parking privileges or sick leave, they have also been used 
to monitor individuals suspected of breaking the newly imposed smoking ban. More 
recently, a plan to establish a network of more than 200 CCTV cameras in and 
around the predominantly Muslim areas of Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath in 
Birmingham has led to renewed public concern about the use of police surveillance 
powers, not least because of the lack of public consultation and potential threat to 
individual privacy (Thames Valley Police, 2010).  
 
RIPA has been commented on by the courts as 'a particularly puzzling statute' and 
'perplexing'.3 The system of internal self-authorisation, without the requirement for 
judicial oversight, has given rise to concern and leaves open the possibility of serious 
errors and inadvertent use of otherwise illegal surveillance techniques. For example, 
the courts recently found that internal authorisation was inappropriate where the 
interference was with legal professional privilege. Further problems come to light in 
relation to public spaces. There is no current statutory regime for the regulation of 
CCTV cameras, despite the recommendations of the House of Lords. As such, it is 
difficult for individuals who believe their privacy rights have been violated by the use 
of CCTV to obtain a remedy under the law. Furthermore, the use of CCTV and other 
public surveillance techniques can have a significant chilling effect on free speech 
and peaceful protest, as the Court of Appeal noted in one case, finding that the 
taking and retention of photographs by the police of protestors was disproportionate.4 
 
Although it is clear that the public is deeply concerned about the steady expansion in 
state surveillance and how their personal information is being used and protected, 
there are also growing fears about the discriminatory effects of surveillance and data 
INTRODUCTION 
3 
collection. According to separate reports published by the Commission (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2009) and GeneWatch (Staley, 2005), the National DNA 
Database not only poses a danger to the privacy of the public at large, but also has 
the potential to reinforce existing patterns of disadvantage and discrimination. As the 
Commission's report notes, black men, young children, and people with mental 
health conditions are already over-represented on the database, and there is 
evidence to suggest that the proportion of Asian people on the database is increasing 
beyond their proportion to the general population.5 Initiatives such as the National 
DNA Database not only threaten to divide the UK into a country of privacy ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’, but they also have the potential to undermine the general protections 
guaranteed by Article 8 and the HRA. As the ECtHR observed in the 2008 case of S 
and Marper v UK, while the state may be justified in using advanced technologies in 
the fight against crime, it also has a special responsibility for ensuring that privacy 
and personal information are properly protected.6  
 
In the 2010 Queen’s Speech, the new Government acknowledged many of these 
concerns, and announced a series of reforms aimed at curbing the spread of 
surveillance in the UK. In particular, it pledged to abolish identity cards and the 
National Identity Register, the ContactPoint database on children, and indicated that 
it would abandon the next generation of biometric passports. ContactPoint has now 
been abolished, and many of the Government’s other policy commitments are 
already in the process of being fulfilled. Further, the Government has indicated that it 
will limit the retention of information on the National DNA Database, introduce a new 
regulatory framework for CCTV, and outlaw the fingerprinting of children at school 
without parental permission. These reforms represent a significant shift in 
government thinking about the importance of privacy and the need for clear limits on 
state surveillance and data collection. 
 
However, as this report will show, there is much more to be done. As UK privacy law 
has struggled to keep pace with the demands of government and changes in the 
technology of information gathering and data sharing, the protection of information 
privacy has become increasingly fragmented and incoherent. In addition to the 
protections provided by Article 8 and the HRA, aspects of individual privacy in the UK 
are also governed by the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, RIPA, and the common 
law. The situation is further complicated by the fact that although Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are subject to the HRA, they also have their own distinct legislative 
regimes when it comes to matters of privacy and data protection. Equally, there is 
considerable confusion surrounding the regulation of surveillance by the police and 
security services, and the role of the various bodies responsible for monitoring them 
and enforcing the law. In part, some of this confusion has arisen from the ambiguity 
that surrounds the rules and procedures set out in RIPA.7 It is also, however, a 
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function of the fact that there is considerable overlap between the powers and 
responsibilities of the various commissioners responsible for protecting privacy in the 
UK, as well as large gaps in the regulatory frameworks in which they currently 
operate. Finally, there is also a lack of public and political understanding about the 
importance of privacy, how surveillance works, and the types of legal redress 
available to individuals who can prove they have been harmed by the misuse of their 
personal information.  
 
If the current programme of legislative reform is to be successful, it must be 
accompanied by a more fundamental review of law regarding information privacy and 
the regulation of surveillance and data collection in the UK. Taking the right to privacy 
contained in Article 8 of the ECHR as our starting point, there is a clear need for a 
more coherent approach to the problem of reconciling privacy with competing 
interests such as security, crime prevention, and the efficient delivery of public 
services. It is also important to ensure that any changes to the existing law of privacy 
and the regulation of surveillance are consistent with the principles set out in the 
HRA, and strengthen the right to respect for private and family life contained in Article 
8 of the ECHR.  
 
1.2 The aim of the report 
As a statutory body, the Commission has a duty to promote equality, build good 
relations and protect human rights, and encourage compliance with the HRA and 
other human rights obligations under international treaties (Equality Act 2006, 
Section 9). In fulfilling these roles, and as a modern regulator, it is appropriate for the 
Commission to consider the protection of information privacy. Government has a 
responsibility to ensure that the information gathering and surveillance activities of 
the state are consistent with the right to respect for private and family life, and that 
any infringement of this right is proscribed by law, properly justified, necessary, and 
proportionate. Further, the state has positive obligations to ensure protection of 
Convention rights; this could include requirements to establish a sufficient statutory 
and regulatory framework to ensure that Convention rights, including Article 8 rights, 
are not infringed.  
 
The aim of the report is to provide an overview of the current state of information 
privacy law and surveillance regulation in the UK, with a particular focus on the 
question of whether the rights contained in Article 8 of the ECHR are being 
adequately protected. The report also examines various approaches to the legal 
protection of privacy and the regulation of surveillance and data collection, identifies 
weaknesses in the current approach to privacy and surveillance, and makes a series 
of recommendations aimed at ensuring that the rights contained in Article 8 are 
respected. Although this report is not intended to provide a detailed blueprint for the 
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protection and regulation of information privacy, it aims to develop the Commission’s 
expertise in this important area, and seeks to establish the Commission as a key 
contributor to the ongoing debate about the future of privacy in the UK.  
 
The scope of the report is limited in four main ways. First, it focuses on one particular 
aspect of privacy: information privacy. As a result, although the report touches on 
aspects of physical privacy – such as an individual’s right to privacy in their body or 
their home – its main concern is with the collection, use, and communication of 
personal information. Information privacy is affected by what happens in other 
dimensions insofar as personal data may be collected through processes associated 
with them – for instance, body searches and scanning, or electronic tagging. But it is 
not practical to investigate all dimensions in a report of this nature, although the 
human rights issues as well as certain recommendations are also germane to a 
multidimensional view of privacy.  
 
Second, because one of the key responsibilities of the Commission is to ensure that 
government and the public sector respect the rights set out in the HRA, this report 
focuses on threats to information privacy arising from the activities of the state. 
Although the growing use of personal information by the private sector also poses a 
significant challenge to privacy, this report only considers the private sector insofar 
as it acts in conjunction with the state as is, for example, increasingly the case in the 
areas of health care and social services.  
 
Third, this report does not attempt to deal with the relationship between information 
privacy and the media. Even though many well-known privacy cases involve media 
coverage of prominent politicians, business people, and celebrities, a detailed 
consideration of the complex issues surrounding the relationship between the right to 
privacy and the right to freedom of expression is beyond the scope of a report of this 
length. 
 
Fourth, although this report is concerned with the protection of information privacy in 
the UK, its main focus is on England and Wales. References to the relevant law in 
Scotland – which is based, in part, on a different legislative and regulatory framework 
– are included largely for purposes of comparison, and the position in Northern 
Ireland is not considered. Applicable laws are treated as uniform throughout the UK 
except where otherwise indicated. Nonetheless, any reform of the law must take 
account of differences between the UK’s three legal jurisdictions and the devolution 
settlements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
 
Central to this report are two key assumptions. First, that any reform of the existing 
law must take place within the broad framework established by the HRA. By 
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incorporating Article 8 of the ECHR into domestic law – which establishes that all 
individuals have a right to respect for their private and family life – the HRA 
fundamentally changed the way in which privacy is understood in the UK, and 
substantially increased the level of protection afforded to individual privacy in both 
the public and private sectors. This report takes the provisions of the HRA as its 
starting point, and as a consequence the reforms proposed are all intended to 
enhance the protections provided by Article 8. 
 
The second assumption is that it is important for the government and parliament to 
be clear about the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, and what it is that 
privacy laws and other means of regulation seek to protect. For the law of privacy 
and the regulation of surveillance and data collection to develop in a coherent and 
consistent way, future reforms must be guided by a commitment to a clear set of 
principles. In this report, a number of justifications of privacy are examined, with a 
view to explaining how these alternative accounts of privacy lead to different 
conclusions about the role of the law and legal regulation. By relating the specific 
proposals presented in this report to these justifications, we hope to provide a better 
insight into the choices available and to provide lawmakers with a principled 
framework for future reform. 
 
1.3  Structure of the report 
Following on from this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the key 
challenges and threats to information privacy, with a particular focus on the various 
social and technological trends that have emerged in recent years. Although 
successive UK governments have sought to provide protection for privacy through a 
range of statutes and a complex system of regulation, what has emerged is a weak, 
fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy that is ill-equipped to deal with 
challenges that lie ahead. This Chapter stresses the need to develop a more flexible, 
comprehensive approach to the protection of privacy, based on a firm commitment to 
Article 8 of the ECHR and a combination of both principles-based regulation and non-
legal protections. 
 
Chapter 3 then looks at why privacy matters. It highlights several prominent and 
overlapping theories of privacy that have influenced existing approaches to 
regulation, and emphasises the importance of taking a context-specific approach to 
issues of information privacy. In particular, this Chapter considers which approaches 
to privacy are most likely to enhance – rather than undermine – the rights contained 
in Article 8 of the ECHR and the existing framework of data protection in the UK. 
 
In Chapter 4, the report then turns to a detailed analysis of the various laws and 
regulations that govern the data protection and privacy in the UK. Using various 
INTRODUCTION 
7 
recent examples and cases, this Chapter argues that the current framework is no 
longer fit for purpose, and in urgent need of rationalisation and reform. In addition to 
emphasising the need for greater legislative consistency and regulatory coherence, 
the report argues that more attention needs to be paid to the requirements of Article 
8, and the need to consider complementary, non-legal approaches to the protection 
of information privacy.  
 
Chapter 5 examines various complementary approaches to the protection of personal 
data, including the use of codes of practice and statutory guidelines. In addition, it 
discusses various non-legal means of protecting information privacy – such as 
‘privacy-enhancing technologies’, ‘privacy by design’, and ‘privacy impact 
assessment’ – all of which aim to ensure that organisations pay more attention to 
privacy and to see that their data handling practices are consistent with the demands 
of Article 8. The Chapter also considers the importance of public awareness and 
education programmes, and the need for regulators, non-governmental 
organisations, and the media to play a greater role in helping the public to protect 
their own privacy.  
 
In Chapter 6, a number of new approaches to the protection of information privacy 
are considered. These include new legislation aimed at consolidating the current law, 
and a re-organisation of the existing system of privacy regulation and 
Commissioners. In addition, this Chapter argues in favour of the incorporation of 
more ‘soft law’ and technical means of privacy protection. However, establishing 
these reforms requires a foundation of principles – related to concepts of privacy – as 
the touchstone for information privacy protection. The report finds that ‘principles-
based regulation’ and legislation can reformulate existing principles, supplementing 
them by further ones reflecting changing technological and policy circumstances as 
well as contextual variations shaping individuals’ experience of privacy. In addition, 
reform must involve other participants and policy actors besides lawmakers and 
regulators. 
 
Based on this, Chapter 7 makes four specific recommendations: 
 
(1) That there is a need for the development of a clear set of ‘privacy principles’ 
that can be used as the basis for future legislation, and which can be used to 
guide the decisions of regulators and government agencies concerned with 
information privacy and data collection in different contexts. 
 
(2) Existing legislation that touches on privacy should be reformed to ensure that it 
is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that it 
enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At 
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minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and 
data protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance.  
 
(3) That an effort should be made to rationalise and consolidate the current 
approach to the regulation of surveillance and data collection in the UK, with 
particular attention being paid to the relationship between the various statutory 
Commissioners responsible for protecting information privacy. 
 
(4) That the use of technological and non-legal information privacy protections 
should be encouraged by government, and that more resources should be 
devoted to public education and awareness around privacy.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes the report by restating that information privacy is a fundamental 
right which is at risk of being eroded by the growing demand for information by 
government and the private sector. It urges the reform of law and the creation of a 
regulatory system capable of protecting information privacy in order to preserve the 
right to privacy in future. 
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2. The changing landscape of privacy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years the landscape of privacy has changed dramatically in the UK. New 
information technologies and forms of communication have continued to emerge and 
develop, and have presented the public and private sectors with a host of new ways 
of collecting, processing, and sharing the personal information of their clients and 
customers. At the same time, although a series of landmark legislative reforms – 
most notably the introduction of the HRA 1998, the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998, 
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 – have transformed how 
the UK approaches data collection and state surveillance, over the last 10 years the 
law and other regulatory mechanisms have struggled to keep up with the pace of 
technological change or to develop a comprehensive framework for the protection of 
information privacy.  
 
We have also seen a rise in public interest in privacy, and a growing anxiety about 
the prospect of the UK being transformed into a ‘surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004; 
Surveillance Studies Network, 2006). According to a report analysing the Information 
Commissioner’s Office’s (ICO) tracking of public attitudes (SMSR, 2010), protecting 
personal information continues to be of great concern to the general public. Indeed, 
only prevention of crime ranks higher. Overall, a majority of the UK public continues 
to lack confidence in the way their personal information is protected and handled, 
with 60 per cent believing that they have lost control over the way personal data is 
collected and processed.  
 
Thomas and Walport’s (2008) review of data sharing also underlined this point, 
referring to a number of high profile incidents involving the loss of personal data by 
government that have only heightened public anxiety over how their data is looked 
after. In October 2007, for example, two computer discs owned by HM Revenue and 
Customs with the personal details (names, addresses, National Insurance numbers 
and bank details) of all families in the UK who were claiming benefits went missing 
when the disks were sent by a junior officer via TNT courier to the National Audit 
Office. It was later revealed that the data protection manual for HMRC staff was itself 
under restriction and available to only senior members, not junior civil servants. In 
addition, the ICO has recently highlighted further examples of serious data losses, 
including: 
  
• The theft of two unencrypted laptops containing personal information relating to 
17 patients, which were stolen from the Medical Day Centre of Birmingham 
Children’s Hospital. The data included patient diagnoses, video recordings and 
information on the health of individual patients. (July 2010) 
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• The loss of a CD containing scans of 112 patient records from the Intensive Care 
Unit of New Cross Hospital. The CD was discovered at a bus stop near the 
hospital and was unencrypted with no password protection. (August 2010) 
 
• The loss of an unencrypted USB stick containing sensitive data of patients’ 
conditions and medication, mislaid on a train journey by a junior doctor employed 
by East & North Hertfordshire NHS Trust. It has not yet been recovered. 
(September 2010) 
 
• The loss of an unencrypted memory stick containing personal information held by 
the Forth Valley NHS Board, which was later handed in to the press. Enquires 
established that the information had been uploaded by a member of staff onto a 
personally owned memory stick that was then lost. (September 2010) 
 
As a consequence of changes in technology, communications, and public attitudes to 
personal information, the landscape of privacy in the UK is now drastically different 
from that which existed even a decade ago. Although the law, and society generally, 
are now faced with a range of difficult choices when it comes to the question of how 
best to regulate the use of personal data and protect individual privacy, there is 
clearly a public appetite for change and reform. Put simply, the landscape of privacy 
has never been as fluid as it is in 2010, nor has there been a more opportune 
moment for reform and the strengthening of a rights-based approach to the 
protection of information privacy. 
 
This Chapter provides a brief overview of the key challenges and threats to 
information privacy in the UK, and identifies some of the major social and 
technological trends that have and continue to transform the landscape. It touches on 
a wide range of social, technological, and legal issues that will be developed 
throughout this report, with a view to providing a perspective on the challenges and 
opportunities ahead as regards the protection of information privacy in the UK.  
 
2.2 Information privacy: challenges, concerns, and responses 
Although privacy is by its very nature a fragile right, (Goold, 2007) personal 
information privacy is under particular threat in today’s ‘information economy’ and 
‘information-age government’. Advanced systems of information and communication 
technology (ICT) now collect, process, and share information about every aspect of 
an individual’s life, information that is used to construct profiles of our habits and 
behaviour, track our location and movements, evaluate risks and opportunities, and 
shape policies and business plans. As the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution noted in 2009:8  
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Surveillance is an inescapable part of life in the UK. Every time we make a 
telephone call, send an email, browse the Internet, or even walk down our 
local high street, our actions may be monitored and recorded. To respond 
to crime, combat the threat of terrorism, and improve administrative 
efficiency, successive UK governments have gradually constructed one of 
the most extensive and technologically advanced surveillance systems in 
the world. At the same time, similar developments in the private sector 
have contributed to a profound change in the character of life in this 
country. The development of electronic surveillance and the collection and 
processing of personal information have become pervasive, routine, and 
almost taken for granted. Many of these surveillance practices are 
unknown to most people, and their potential consequences are not fully 
appreciated. (House of Lords 2009, para. 1) 
 
The ability to collect and process personal information is essential to law 
enforcement, national security, and public sector service delivery. Yet although 
information systems and data sharing have always been a central part of the modern 
state’s bureaucratic infrastructure, technological developments and a steady 
expansion in the role of government have resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
amount of personal information held by the public sector in recent years. In order to 
maintain the UK’s borders, provide effective policing, and combat the threat of 
terrorism, successive governments have argued that it is vital for the state to be able 
to obtain, access, process, and share large amounts of these confidential details. 
Furthermore, as the line between the public and private sectors has continued to 
blur, this information is increasingly being shared. Add to this the growing popularity 
of internet shopping, online banking, and social networking sites like Facebook, and it 
is easy to see why data regulation and governance has become steadily more 
complex. 
 
As more information is made available and shared between organisations, the 
danger that this information will be misused, misplaced or misunderstood increases. 
People may, for example, consent to provide information to an organisation for one 
purpose and then later discover that the same (or some other) organisation has used 
it for something else, possibly in breach of the DPA. Where that information has been 
taken out of context and combined with other pieces of personal data, it may result in 
the construction of a profile that is unwanted or unauthorised, or that the individual 
may believe to be inaccurate or misleading. In many cases, an individual will only 
discover that their personal information has been shared when it used by an 
organisation to make some decision about them, such as whether they are eligible 
for a state benefit or qualify for a credit card or bank loan. As the demand for 
information in both the public and private sectors grows, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for individuals to understand what happens to their personal information, or 
what they should do when that information is misused. 
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Previous governments have tried to respond to these various developments and 
challenges, but unfortunately many of their efforts have met with limited success. The 
introduction of the DPA was, for example, hailed at the time as a major development 
in the protection of information privacy in the UK. Enacted in response to the 
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, the DPA established a new legal 
framework for the protection of personal data. In addition to laying down a clear set of 
principles for the collection, processing and use of personal data by both public and 
private sectors, the Act also establishes a regulatory structure designed to ensure 
compliance with these principles and prevent practices that might threaten individual 
privacy. However, the Act is also severely limited in a number of key respects. First 
and foremost, it does not directly address many of the problems associated with the 
widespread sharing of personal data within government, between the public and 
private sectors, or between private organisations.  
 
Similarly, RIPA was introduced to meet the UK's obligations to place state 
surveillance systems under an Article 8-compliant regime. However – as will be 
described later – there are serious flaws with RIPA itself, including its unclear system 
of authorisation, deficiencies in judicial oversight, and inappropriate use of powers – 
for example, by local authorities. Certain aspects of surveillance, most notably in 
relation to CCTV, stand outside the regulatory regime. In addition, many of the rules 
and regulations contained in the DPA and RIPA, as well as the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) 2000, and its counterpart in Scotland, are interpreted, 
administered and overseen by a range of separate regulators and independent 
tribunals, and courts.9 Although the introduction of the HRA has seen the 
establishment of a general right to privacy – by virtue of the incorporation of Article 8 
of the ECHR into domestic law – the courts have been relatively cautious in their 
application and development of the right. As a consequence, there is no common 
approach to the protection of personal information in the UK, or a clear legal 
consensus on the limits of individual privacy.  
 
It is against this weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to regulation that concerns 
about information privacy and state surveillance have begun to emerge in recent 
years. While the UK has one of the most extensive systems of public-area 
surveillance in the world – with estimates of the number of CCTV cameras running 
into the millions – as well as a large array of massive state databases, it would be 
wrong to assume that the public are unconcerned about privacy and data protection. 
As has already been noted, recent revelations about the loss of personal data by 
many departments and agencies of the state, and the use of RIPA powers by local 
authorities, have served to focus media and public attention on the question of 
privacy, and have led to a fundamental review of the way in which government and 
the private sector collect and use personal information (Cabinet Office, 2008).  
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In addition, the ambivalent reaction to the now-abandoned national identity card 
scheme has also served to bring into sharper relief the importance of privacy in the 
context of the relationship between the citizen and the state. Although in the past the 
question of how much the state should be allowed to know about us may not have 
been especially high on the political agenda, there are now calls for a reconsideration 
of the current approach to data collection and sharing within government, and the 
limits of e-government more generally. Equally, in recent years both the public and 
the courts have begun to question whether Article 8 goes far enough, and whether a 
more general right to privacy that applies beyond the public sector is needed. In 
short, the landscape of privacy is changing rapidly, both as new challenges to the 
current privacy regime emerge and public concern over the future of privacy 
continues to grow.  
 
2.3 Opportunities for reform 
There are a number of reasons why the area of privacy is currently in need of reform. 
First, developments in information technology, as well as changes in the way in 
which the public and private sectors now collect and use personal data, have 
produced a range of challenges that did not exist when the current system of privacy 
protections was established close to a decade ago. In addition, the sheer amount of 
personal information being collected, processed, and shared in the UK now presents 
a serious challenge to both the existing legislative regime and the regulators charged 
with administering it (Goold, 2009). Although recent changes to the funding and 
powers of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) have, for example, helped to 
ameliorate this problem, it remains the case that many of those responsible for 
protecting privacy and enforcing the law still lack the necessary resources or 
statutory authority to do so effectively. Finally, while it may have been the case that 
there was no need for an overarching rationale behind the protection of privacy in the 
past, as the distinction between state and private surveillance continues to be blurred 
by the increase of data collection and sharing across and between sectors, there is a 
danger that the system of regulation has become so disparate and convoluted that it 
is beyond the ability of ordinary members of the public to understand or to resort to it 
in protection of their rights.  
 
Although it may be tempting to view the current system of privacy protections as a 
barrier to reform, this report takes a different view. While it may be true that the 
existing system of regulation lacks a coherent, guiding rationale and is in need of 
more resources, many of its constituent parts are functioning reasonably well and 
enjoy broad support. For example, the enactment of the DPA – and with it the 
establishment of the ICO – is widely regarded as a having been a fundamental step 
forward in UK privacy protection, and both the Act and the ICO continue to enjoy 
significant public and political support. Similarly, few would argue that the 
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incorporation of Article 8 of the ECHR into domestic law has not been a positive step, 
and in many respects the contribution to UK privacy law stands as one of the major 
achievements of the HRA.  
 
Where there is, however, room for change, is in the overarching rationale and 
framework of regulation. As the technologies of data collection and surveillance 
continue to converge and become more ubiquitous, a system of legislation based on 
the idea that different sectors of government and society require different forms of 
privacy regulation is beginning to look increasingly outdated and impractical. This 
raises the question whether we need to build on existing legal, technological, and 
institutional frameworks for the protection of privacy, or whether more fundamental 
reform is needed, and is one of the key questions addressed in this report. How do 
we move forward in such a way as to preserve what is working well in the current 
system, while also ensuring that privacy protections are developed that are capable 
of dealing with a rapidly changing social and technological landscape?  
 
2.4 Summary 
This Chapter has provided a brief overview of the changing landscape of privacy in 
the UK, with a view to identifying some of the key challenges and opportunities for 
reform. Successive UK governments have sought to provide protection for privacy 
through a range of statutes and a complex system of regulation, but what has 
emerged is a weak, fractured and piecemeal approach to privacy that is ill-equipped 
to deal with the challenges that lie ahead. There is a clear need for reform and a 
need to develop a more flexible, comprehensive approach to the protection of 
privacy. This must be based on a firm commitment to Article 8 of the ECHR, and 
combine principles-based legislation and regulation with non-legal protections.  
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3.  Why privacy matters 
 
3.1 Introduction 
How does one place a value on privacy? What should the law of privacy aim to 
protect? How do we reconcile a strong commitment to privacy as a fundamental right 
with the demands of national security, law enforcement, and the state’s demands for 
personal information? Does the current approach to the protection of privacy in the 
UK leave certain groups vulnerable to excessive state surveillance and exacerbate 
existing patterns of discrimination? Is it correct to talk about the need for a balance 
between privacy and the public interest, or does this suggest a false opposition 
between these two values?  
 
These are all questions that lie at the heart of any discussion about the development 
of privacy law and the regulation of state surveillance and data collection. In order to 
answer them, it is not only important to have a clear understanding of what is 
possible in terms of existing legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms, but also 
an appreciation of the justifications for privacy. Unless we can agree on why privacy 
matters, we cannot hope to develop a coherent or consistent framework for its 
protection. In this section, we briefly review some of the major theories of privacy, 
and consider the relationship between privacy and the state’s need for personal 
information. Different justifications of privacy are likely to point to different 
conclusions about the type and extent of regulation needed – questions that are 
explored in later chapters. 
 
3.2 Making a case for privacy 
There are several dimensions of privacy, including privacy of one’s personal 
information, one’s body, personal space, and one’s communications. The focus of 
this project is on information privacy, but it also touches on certain aspects of the 
privacy of communications where records of communication are retained.  
 
One of the major difficulties associated with attempts to protect privacy is the problem 
of definition.10 Privacy is said to be ‘a concept in disarray’ (Solove, 2008, p.1), and it 
is difficult to find a single, accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is most useful 
to see ‘privacy’ as an umbrella term that covers a range of situations in which many 
different types of interests are affected (Solove, 2008, ch.2). This perspective 
recognises, for example, that some forms of personal information only become 
‘private’ due to the circumstances in which they are collected or communicated 
(Nissenbaum, 2010). Equally, it acknowledges that the way we view privacy is 
intimately bound up with our understanding the public/private divide, and that this 
boundary is constantly shifting as a result of the ever-changing relationship between 
the individual and the state. Finally, this broad approach to privacy helps to ensure 
PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY 
16 
that we do not simply regard privacy as a function of person or place, but rather as a 
product of the two, and that we do not fall into the trap of thinking that privacy is just 
about confidentiality or good data management practices. 
 
Just as there is no agreed definition of privacy, there are also many different but 
overlapping ways in which privacy can be understood and justified. Privacy can, for 
example, be seen as a good in itself – as essential to our development as individuals, 
and bound up with ideas of dignity, liberty, and ‘personhood’. In addition to promoting 
these values, privacy can also be justified on more instrumental grounds. Without a 
degree of privacy, it can become very difficult for individuals to maintain a distinction 
between their personal and public lives, or to exercise other important social and 
political rights, such as rights to freedom of religion, freedom of association, and 
freedom of expression.  
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this report to consider these and other 
justifications for privacy in any great depth, it is important to be aware of the different 
ways of understanding privacy if we are to develop a programme of reform based on 
a set of clear and coherent principles. For the purpose of this report, we have 
identified six main theories for privacy, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
Privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’  
Central to this notion of privacy is the ability of individuals to keep society and the 
state at bay, and to obtain a remedy where there has been an unwanted intrusion. 
The notion of privacy as ‘the right to be let alone’ was first advanced by Warren and 
Brandeis (1890), and has been referred to extensively in discussions of the Fourth 
Amendment in the United States and with reference to Section 8 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Many of the privacy protections developed in the 
UK as well as in the United States and Canada are based on this notion of privacy, 
and it has deep roots in the civil liberties traditions of these countries. This idea 
corresponds to many conventional understandings of privacy, such as ‘a man’s home 
is his castle’, and reflects a desire on the part of individuals to avoid the prying eyes 
of others. This approach to privacy also plays a prominent part in many liberal 
accounts of the state, which stress the need for clear limits on the power of the state 
and the importance of privacy to the exercise of individual freedom.  
 
Privacy as an aspect of personhood 
 According to this justification, all individuals need a degree of privacy in order to 
protect their dignity, develop as persons, and maintain a sense of self while retaining 
the ability to form meaningful relationships with others (Bloustein, 1964; Rachels, 
1975; Schoeman, 1992; Rössler, 2005). Closely linked to ideas of autonomy and 
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liberty, this justification has frequently been relied on by the ECtHR in its discussions 
of the ambit of Article 8 of the ECHR (Feldman, 1994, 2002).  
 
Privacy as control over information 
 Most commonly associated with the privacy theorist Westin (1967), and also in the 
German conception of ‘informational self-determination’, this account of privacy 
argues that individuals have the right to control their own personal information, and 
should be able to determine how and when information about them is communicated 
to others. Often associated with the idea of ‘fair information practices’, this idea has 
been very influential in the development of data protection laws across the world, and 
has been at the heart of discussions about the appropriate balance to be struck 
between the individual’s control over personal information and the state’s interests in 
processing data. It is important to note that while this justification of privacy presumes 
that some level of control over personal information is possible, it also acknowledges 
that the degree of control an individual is likely to be able to exercise will depend on 
their circumstances, as well as on the type of information in question.  
 
Privacy as limited access to the self  
Broader than the idea of privacy as the right to be let alone, this justification of 
privacy is based on the idea that individuals should be able to control who has 
access to both their person and to information about them (Gavison, 1980). Often 
linked to arguments about informational self-determination, this justification suggests 
that privacy should be understood as a form of proprietary interest which gives 
individuals the right to determine who they interact with and on what terms (Gross, 
1967).  
 
Privacy as secrecy 
Similar to the idea of privacy as limited access, this narrower justification maintains 
that privacy is best understood as the individual’s right to conceal facts about herself 
(Posner, 1978). It is a justification that has enjoyed considerable support from 
economic theorists of law, and that focuses on the idea that the value of information 
is often dependent on our ability to keep it secret and prevent unwanted disclosure. 
This justification is often criticised, however, on the grounds that the only people who 
need secrecy are those who have something to hide. This argument ignores the fact 
that there are many reasons why a person may want to keep something private, and 
that a desire for secrecy is not always evidence of bad behaviour. Individuals may, 
for example, keep personal information secret not out of any sense of shame, but 
because they fear that the information may be misunderstood when taken out of 
context. Equally, we keep some types of intimate information secret because we 
recognise that the act of sharing it can be an important step in the formation of close 
personal relationships.  
PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY 
18 
Privacy as a social and political value 
 In addition to recognising privacy as an individual right with intrinsic value, this view 
of privacy is based on the claim that privacy is fundamentally important to the 
maintenance of a liberal, democratic society. According to this approach, privacy is 
valuable for two related reasons. First, it enables individuals to establish and 
maintain a variety of complex social relationships, and thereby contributes to the 
development of a rich and diverse society. Second, it is important because it is 
necessary to protect key political rights – such as freedom of association, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of religion – from the chilling effects of excessive state 
surveillance: a private ‘space’ is necessary for the development of dissenting views 
that enrich political life. It is therefore in the public interest for a democratic society to 
protect privacy, in addition to whatever value privacy may have for the individual 
(Regan, 1995; Bennett and Raab, 2006; Solove, 2008; Goold, 2009; Nissenbaum, 
2010). 
 
Given the extent to which these justifications overlap with one another, it is not 
necessary to choose between them. Instead, we should adopt a comprehensive 
approach to the question of privacy that both recognises that there are many 
legitimate justifications for privacy, while also acknowledging that the strength of any 
given justification will, to a large extent, depend on circumstances and context. 
Different ideas of privacy come into play, for example, when people are engaged in 
commercial activities as opposed to simply seeking the solitude they need to 
maintain a sense of dignity and self esteem. Equally, members of lawful political 
organisations may have very different reasons for wanting to keep their meetings 
private when compared with someone undergoing regular treatment for a serious 
illness. Privacy depends on context, and as such can be justified on many different 
grounds. 
 
Having said this, however, it is still fundamentally important to be clear about what it 
is that any privacy law or regulatory regime is trying to achieve. Given that privacy is 
so notoriously difficult to define, there is always a temptation to avoid being clear 
about the exact purpose of protection, and to focus instead on addressing particular 
threats or developing responses to immediate challenges. There are significant 
disadvantages to this approach, as emphasised by a leading expert on privacy law 
and theory (Solove, 2008, p.2):  
 
Judges, politicians, … and scholars have often failed to adequately 
conceptualize the problems that privacy law is asked to redress. Privacy 
problems are often not well articulated, and as a result, we frequently lack 
a compelling account of what is at stake when privacy is threatened and 
what precisely the law must do to solve these problems. 
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In attempting to develop new forms of privacy protection – or to reform existing ones 
– it is important to clarify which of the above justifications is being relied upon and in 
what context. Although these ideas of privacy are not mutually exclusive, they are 
clearly focused on different values and concerns. As a result, the choice of 
justification will have a significant effect on how one defines the limits of and 
legitimate exceptions to privacy, identifies potential threats to privacy, and chooses 
between different legal and regulatory protections for privacy. This can be 
demonstrated by focusing on the question of whether the law should be based on a 
default expectation of privacy or a default assumption of information disclosure. If 
one is committed to the idea that privacy is, for example, essential to the exercise of 
personal autonomy and the development of the self, then one is more likely to take a 
‘rights-based’ approach and conclude that the law should require a prima facie 
justification for all privacy infringements – especially, for example, where visual 
surveillance is involved. In contrast, if one believes that privacy is bound up with the 
ability to control information, then – in circumstances where personal data is 
collected – one is more likely to invoke fair information practices and laws that seek 
to reconcile privacy interests with the information demands of the public and private 
sectors. In practice, these approaches are normally combined, and the means/ends 
distinction between rights and information control is not clear. 
 
3.3 Privacy and the state 
As indicated earlier, the main focus of this report is the state, which is taken to refer 
to central and local government, law-enforcement authorities, and other 
organisations outside the ‘public sector’ undertaking public functions or that have 
access to personal data collected on behalf of the state. In addition to the problem of 
defining privacy, there is also the question of how privacy rights should be 
understood in the context of the state’s legitimate need for information. Many recent 
studies and investigations – for example, by the Surveillance Studies Network (2006) 
– have shown how surveillance is increasingly becoming a feature of everyday life in 
areas that were previously considered ‘private’. As surveillance cameras and tracking 
devices become cheaper and more ubiquitous, it is increasingly difficult for people to 
find places that can truly be considered private. Instead, the promise of privacy in 
public spaces such as streets and parks is increasingly unrealistic, with the result that 
the boundaries of individual privacy are increasingly being tested and eroded.  
 
In addition, these studies have also revealed the extent to which personal information 
collected by the state is being shared across government agencies or with the private 
sector, often without the knowledge of the individuals concerned. Aside from the fact 
that this sharing increases the likelihood that information will be taken out of context 
or used for purposes other than those for which it was originally collected, it also 
makes it difficult for individuals to keep track of their personal information. If they are 
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unable to determine easily what the state or private sector knows about them, then it 
becomes extremely difficult to challenge decisions made on the basis of that 
information, to check its accuracy, or to hold anyone accountable for errors or 
misuse. 
 
To some extent, the DPA helps to ensure that the state does not systematically 
misuse personal information or engage in activities that might seriously undermine 
individual privacy. For example, by laying down the requirement of ‘fair processing’ 
and giving individuals the ability to access their data, the Act helps to make the use 
of information by the state more transparent. In addition, the Act also sets out the 
conditions for the legitimate collection and sharing of personal data without consent – 
for example, in the exercise of statutory powers – and prohibits the use of personal 
data for incompatible purposes. However, these important rules and restrictions are 
often difficult to enforce, and remedies can be hard to come by. Although public 
awareness of the right to see one’s own personal data reportedly increased from 75 
per cent in 2004 to over 90 per cent in 2009, many individuals remain unaware of the 
range of protections provided by the DPA (ICO, 2010b, p.19). Furthermore, even 
where they are aware, they may be discouraged from exercising their rights by the 
apparent lack of significant sanctions.  
 
Similarly, RIPA was created to ensure that the system for regulation of the use of 
intrusive surveillance powers was in accordance with Article 8, and establishes a 
process of authorisation for the use of intrusive surveillance powers. However, the 
Act is complex and difficult to use, and runs to some 30 further statutory instruments. 
There are concerns about the adequacy of the system of self- authorisation, and in 
many areas – including the regulation of CCTV – the Act's coverage is not 
comprehensive. Placing limits on surveillance does not guarantee that personal data 
is being collected or used appropriately, in part because those limitations are 
constantly being tested by the state and other public organisations.12 
 
By placing greater emphasis on the importance of privacy, the law can help to 
resolve any conflicts that arise between the public or private sector demand for 
information and individuals’ ability to control and monitor how information about them 
is used. In determining the limits of individual privacy, however, we must be clear 
about why and under what circumstances government agencies should be allowed to 
collect, process, and share personal information. Rules, regulations, and human 
rights not only place limits on the information gathering and surveillance powers of 
the state, but also help to define the boundary between the public and private 
spheres and establish the importance of information privacy in a democratic society.  
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Based on the theories of privacy outlined above, there are a number of ways to 
approach this task. Perhaps the most obvious starting point is to note that, while 
privacy should be protected as a fundamental right, its infringement must always be 
in accordance with the law, necessary, proportionate and justified. Privacy can, 
however, also be regarded as one of several competing legal interests or rights. If we 
take the former approach and privilege privacy, then attempts to restrict individual 
privacy in the interests of national security, the enforcement of law, or improvement in 
the efficiency of public service delivery are more likely to be seen as inherently 
problematic, and subject to rigorous tests of necessity and proportionality. This is 
because the promotion of such goals frequently involves restricting the general ambit 
of the right, and threatens to undermine privacy’s legal status, as well as its symbolic 
or practical significance. If, however, privacy is regarded as a legal interest like any 
other – or, in weaker terms, as an individual preference – then it becomes more 
amenable to balancing exercises in an effort to reconcile the aims of the individual 
with those of the state. Put another way, a key question is whether potential threats 
to privacy should be assessed according to human rights criteria such as necessity 
and proportionality, or instead according to principles such as reasonableness and 
balancing.13  
 
Another way to approach the question of how to reconcile privacy and state interests 
is to ask whether a contextual approach to privacy should be adopted. According to 
this approach, while it may be appropriate to provide strong privacy protection in 
some contexts (such as the home), it may not be appropriate to extend similar 
protection in others (such as airports or government buildings). Here, the key is to 
recognise that the importance of privacy varies according to circumstances, and that 
it may be necessary to develop distinct legal protections and regulatory frameworks 
tailored to different contexts and state functions. Taking this approach may resolve 
much of the apparent tension between privacy and the public interest, if only because 
it forces one to acknowledge that the importance of both – and the legitimacy of 
overriding the right of privacy – varies according to the particular situation in which 
they come into conflict. 
 
There are also other issues that must be taken into account when considering the 
relationship between individual privacy and the role of the state. Looking back at the 
justifications canvassed above, and considering that privacy is necessary for the 
exercise of other key human rights – such as the rights to freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and freedom of religion – any discussion of future privacy 
regulation must assess the protection currently afforded to these related rights. Even 
if it is concluded that there is no inevitable conflict between privacy and, say, national 
security, there may be an argument for strengthening protection of the privacy right – 
as we show in later chapters – on the grounds that it is essential to ensure freedom 
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of speech even in times of heightened insecurity or political unrest. This argument is 
closely related to the conception of privacy as a social and political value. Finally, it is 
important to stress that any attempt to reform the law of privacy in the UK must begin 
with the right to respect for private and family life contained in Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The HRA not only incorporates this right into domestic law, but it also places an 
obligation on the government to ensure that the information gathering and 
surveillance activities of the state are consistent with Article 8, and that any 
infringement of the right is in accordance with the law, properly justified, necessary, 
and proportionate. Regardless of which theory of privacy we rely upon or how we 
characterise the tension between the citizen and the state, it is important to 
remember that the onus is always on the state to explain and justify why it should be 
allowed to limit or infringe an individual’s privacy.  
 
3.4 The future of privacy 
It is difficult to foresee what the future might bring, and therefore what kind of legal 
and other regulatory powers might be necessary to protect privacy and keep state 
surveillance and information gathering in check. Some might argue that it is 
inevitable that the modern state’s growing demand for information – coupled with the 
development of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies such as body 
scanning, facial recognition software, and automated data-mining tools – will 
eventually result in a society in which privacy is a thing of the past. According to this 
fatalistic view, any new laws aimed at enhancing existing privacy protections are 
likely to fail, and as a consequence we should simply accept that ‘privacy is dead.’  
 
In contrast, a more optimistic view of the expansion in surveillance and the 
government’s demand for personal information focuses instead on the positive role 
that technology can play in the development of public policy and business planning. 
The previous Government’s ‘transformational’ agenda was in part based on this view. 
It emphasised that improvement in the collection, processing, and sharing of 
information within government did not necessarily have to come at the cost of 
individual privacy if the proper safeguards are firmly in place. Although the promotion 
of e-government is still in its relatively early stages, the state has not yet convincingly 
shown that it can fulfil its public service aims while also protecting the right of privacy. 
A succession of significant data losses in recent years has led many to question 
government’s ability to manage large amounts of confidential information securely, 
and to press for the enactment and enforcement of new laws to ensure that privacy is 
properly protected. 
 
Looking back over the last 40 years, however, there are also other reasons to be 
optimistic about the future of privacy. Although privacy has come under considerable 
pressure from government in recent years, at the same time there has been a 
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gradual strengthening and harmonisation of information privacy and data protection 
laws across Europe and beyond, and a growing level of public awareness about the 
importance of privacy. In the UK, prominent regulators and NGOs, as well as some 
political parties, have also repeatedly warned about the dangers of ‘sleepwalking into 
a surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004), and have helped ensure that privacy remains on 
the political agenda. Finally, in the last decade we have also seen the gradual 
emergence of a jurisprudence of privacy in national and international courts, and an 
increased willingness on the part of judges to favour the protection of privacy over 
vague appeals to national security and the needs of law enforcement. Looked at from 
this perspective, there is reason to believe that the ‘doomsday’ scenario can be 
avoided if an effective legislative and regulatory framework can be established. 
 
In trying to decide how to reconcile a commitment to privacy with the state’s growing 
demand for information, it is important to steer a path between these various 
optimistic and pessimistic accounts. Just as fatalists tend to have an overly 
deterministic view of technology and fail to acknowledge that the law and other 
means of regulation can do much to protect individual privacy, many optimists 
struggle to explain exactly how a ‘balance’ can be struck between privacy and the 
practical realities of the modern state. They also assume that progress is ratcheted 
and cannot be reversed, gloss over existing inadequacies of legal and other controls, 
and take for granted an ongoing political commitment to human rights and the 
protection of privacy. 
 
For our part, the authors of this report believe that, in order to produce a regulatory 
framework capable of meeting the privacy challenges of the twenty-first century, it is 
important to be clear about what it is we are trying to protect, and why it is important, 
and to ensure that any new laws or regulatory mechanisms are able to be 
implemented in practice. In addition, it is also important to ensure that any future 
reforms are built on a solid and principled human rights foundation, and that existing 
laws and regulatory structures are properly evaluated before any attempt is made to 
amend or repeal them. These points will be considered throughout this report. 
Regardless of whether one is optimistic or pessimistic about the future of privacy, it is 
clear that the scale of the challenge ahead requires law-makers to move carefully, 
and to avoid the fractured and piecemeal approach that has marred past attempts at 
reform. Although this report does not address it, the question of how privacy can be 
protected in single countries alone, without the international or global collaboration of 
other forces aimed at the same goal, should also be on the agenda.  
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3.5 Summary 
In this Chapter, we have set out the main arguments in defence of information 
privacy, and considered how the growing demands of the state – in particular, in 
relation to national security, law enforcement, and citizens’ access to public services 
– are likely to create new challenges to existing privacy laws and data protection 
regimes. Several prominent and overlapping theories of privacy have influenced 
existing approaches to regulation. It is necessary to take a context-specific approach 
to issues of information privacy and to ensure that the approaches used enhance, 
rather than undermine, the existing framework of rights and data protection in the UK. 
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4. Information privacy in the UK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As is the case in many common law countries, information privacy in the UK is 
governed by a wide variety of legal rules and regulations.14 As information 
technologies and the demands of government have developed over time, however, 
the law has struggled to strike a balance between protecting the privacy of individuals 
and ensuring that the state and private organisations are able to acquire and process 
personal information for legitimate purposes. In particular, there has been a distinct 
tension between calls from the police and the security services – as well as 
organisations responsible for health, education, social welfare, and transport – for 
greater powers of surveillance and data collection, and an emerging public 
awareness of the value of information privacy. 
 
This section of the report provides a general overview of the major laws and legal 
regulations that govern information privacy in the UK, as well as various informal 
rules and guidelines that restrict the ability of public and private organisations to 
collect and handle personal information.15 In an effort to ensure that this summary is 
concise and accessible, specific sections of Acts and judicial decisions are cited 
sparingly. It is also important to stress that this Chapter is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive account or analysis of the relevant law. This has already been done 
by a number of recent parliamentary and independent reviews, many of which are 
cited in this report. Instead, the purpose of this Chapter is to identify areas in which 
the protection of information privacy is either weak or in need of substantial reform.  
 
4.2 Overview of the current law 
At present, there is no single privacy statute or comprehensive ‘privacy law’ in the 
UK. Instead, information privacy is protected through a combination of statutory 
provisions, legal regulations, common law rules, and systems of informal regulation 
(sometimes referred to as ‘soft law’). This section of the report concentrates on the 
following main sources of information privacy protection in the UK:  
 
• The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 
• The Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 
• The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000 
• The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 200016 
• Common law protections and breach of confidence, and 
• Informal regulation, codes of practice, and other forms of ‘soft law’.17 
 
For the sake of simplicity, these different sources of law are examined in this Chapter 
under two broad headings: statutory protections and common law protections. 
PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY 
26 
Because it is difficult to understand the operation of guidelines, codes of practice, 
and ‘soft law’ without also considering the role of regulators and alternative 
approaches to the promotion of information privacy, these protections are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
4.3 Statutory protections 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
Prior to the enactment of the HRA, there was no established statutory or common 
law right to privacy in the UK.18 Although individuals could appeal to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) if they believed that their right to respect for private 
and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR had been infringed, the right could not be 
directly relied upon in UK domestic courts. With the introduction of the HRA, 
however, the ECHR became a part of domestic law, and a general right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8 was established in the UK: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.  
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
It is important to note that the ECtHR has acknowledged that the right to respect for 
private and family life is ‘a broad right not susceptible to exhaustive definition’.19 
Article 8 has been held to include elements such as the right to identity and personal 
development, gender identification, sexual orientation, the right to develop and 
establish relationships and be free from environmental pollution, as well as the more 
traditional privacy rights such as the holding and dissemination of personal 
information. 
 
As a consequence of the incorporation of Article 8 into UK law, it is unlawful for a 
public body to interfere with an individual’s privacy unless that interference is 
authorised by one of the specific exceptions contained in Article 8(2). In practice, this 
means that in addition to any other rules laid down by UK legislation or case law, any 
public body that interferes with an individual’s privacy must be able to demonstrate 
that the interference with the obligation to respect private and family life is: 
 
(1)  Authorised by a law enacted by a democratic process 
(2)  Proportionate to the purpose in question 
(3) Necessary for the functioning of a democratic society, and 
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(4)  Conducted in accordance with one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8(2) 
 of the ECHR. 
 
Since the HRA came into force on 2 October 2000, both the UK and European courts 
have shown an unprecedented interest in questions of privacy. While cases such as 
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] and Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] have 
helped to clarify the scope of the right as it applies to individuals and private 
organisations, decisions such as those handed down in Peck v UK (2003), Liberty v 
UK (2008), and S. & Marper v UK (2008) have also recognised the restrictions the 
ECHR and Article 8 places on the state.  
 
In many respects, S. & Marper v UK (2008) provides a good example of the sorts of 
obligations that Article 8 imposes on the state. In that case, both the applicants had 
been required by the police to provide a DNA sample and have their fingerprints 
taken: S at the age of 11 on arrest for an offence of which he was subsequently 
acquitted; and Mr Marper on arrest in 2001 for an offence which was subsequently 
dropped by the prosecution. The police later refused to destroy their DNA samples 
and fingerprints. On appeal from the House of Lords, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 8 as regards the retention of both the DNA sample and its profile and 
fingerprints. According to the Court, the highly personal nature of a cellular sample 
makes it data that needs to be protected. When considering the retention regimes in 
other states, it noted that England and Wales and Northern Ireland are the only 
jurisdictions within the Council of Europe to allow indefinite retention of fingerprint 
and DNA material of any person of any age suspected of any recordable offence. 
The Court made it clear that any state that takes a leading role in developing 
scientific technologies to fight crime had a special responsibility for striking the right 
balance between the competing public and private interests.  
 
It is also important to note that the limits of the rights contained in Article 8 are 
continually being questioned and tested by the courts. Depending on the 
circumstances, for example, Article 8 can also cover activities carried out in public. 
Recently, the ECtHR has held that in some circumstances photographs of an 
individual in a public place, taken without consent or knowledge, can amount to an 
interference with private life, as there is ‘a zone of interaction of a person with others, 
even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life’.20 
  
Although the ECHR is primarily concerned with limiting the power of the state to 
interfere with individual rights – as in S. & Marper – it is also concerned with positive 
obligations. Under the Convention, states are required to take positive steps or 
measures to protect the Convention rights of individuals, particularly against 
interference by others. In this regard, the Convention recognises that the acts of 
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private individuals or bodies can threaten human rights just as much as the acts of 
state authorities. It is important to note that many of the cases on ‘positive obligation’ 
have involved Article 8 rights, and have considered the question whether the state 
has put in place a legal framework that effectively protects Convention rights. In light 
of this, it can be argued that the HRA requires the government to do more than 
simply respect an individual’s privacy. In addition, it has a duty to protect privacy and 
provide effective regulatory safeguards. 
 
In a similar vein, the requirement that any interference with Article 8 must be ‘in 
accordance with the law’ goes beyond the bare requirement that there must be a 
statutory or common law provision in place. Instead, it is essential that the law in 
question is compatible with the rule of law, sufficiently circumscribed, and subject to 
adequate legal safeguards. For example, it is well established that interference will 
not be in accordance with the law if the impugned power is an arbitrary one.21  
 
Finally, an essential ingredient of the Convention – and the operation of Article 8 – is 
the right to an effective remedy under Article 13. Although the right is not specifically 
included in the HRA, it can be argued that right should be available, as many of the 
Tribunals responsible for regulating state surveillance activities are inaccessible to 
the majority of complainants and bound by highly restrictive procedural rules. 
 
Yet although the HRA and the Convention provide a rights-based framework for the 
protection of information privacy in the UK, in practice the operation of Article 8 is 
limited in a number of key ways. While the courts have made it clear in recent years 
that the obligation to respect private and family life can apply to individuals and 
organisations as well as the state,22 unfortunately this development is most likely to 
benefit those who can afford to go to court to protect their privacy. As noted by the 
privacy expert Dr Chris Pounder: 
 
I am not confident that Article 8 will provide satisfactory jurisprudence 
because there are very few cases going to the courts. Those cases that 
tend to go into the courts primarily involve... people who have celebrity 
status... Anybody who is trying to take an Article 8 case on has to take on 
the unlimited resources of the state. (House of Lords 2009, para. 131) 
 
As important as it is to ensure that individuals have an actionable right to privacy, it is 
equally important to ensure that problems with access to justice do not exacerbate 
the divide between privacy haves and privacy have-nots. If for no other reason, this is 
a compelling reason for supplementing the protections provided by the HRA with 
other rules and regulations aimed at preserving information privacy.  
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Another major limitation to the right to respect for private and family life comes from 
the broad range of exceptions listed in Article 8 itself. Although few would suggest 
that privacy should be an absolute right – that is, a right which cannot be restricted in 
any way, such as the prohibition on torture (Article 3) – the list of exceptions to Article 
8 is extensive when compared with those typically attached to privacy rights in other 
jurisdictions. In particular, the phrase ‘in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic wellbeing of the country’ is so broad as to allow a government 
that is hostile to the privacy interests of individuals to curtail them severely. In 
practice, governments are free to interpret these limitations very broadly, and are 
rarely required to point to empirical evidence to support a call to restrict or infringe 
information privacy.23 As a consequence, there is a danger that an over-reliance on 
the HRA and Article 8 could leave information privacy particularly open to attack from 
an unsympathetic government or public agency. 
 
Finally, there is also the question whether it is reasonable or realistic to expect 
government agencies and other public bodies properly to understand and adhere to 
principles of necessity and proportionality when dealing with the rights set out in 
Article 8. Although the ECHR is clear that any infringement of Article 8 must be both 
necessary and proportionate to the legitimate interest being pursued, courts in the 
UK and Europe have often struggled to provide clear guidance on the meaning and 
scope of these terms.24 Clearly, bodies like the ECtHR play an important role in 
helping to educate those within government and the public sector as to what 
constitutes an unlawful infringement of the right to privacy. Yet despite the efforts of 
the Commission and organisations like Liberty and JUSTICE, the complexity of 
Article 8(2) and uncertainty as to its application remains a major problem for the 
protection of information privacy in the UK.  
 
The Data Protection Act 1998 
In addition to protections provided by the HRA, information privacy and the use of 
personal data in the UK is also regulated by the DPA, which replaced a 1984 Act of 
the same name. The DPA itself was enacted as the UK’s transposition of the 1995 
European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (European Union, 1995), a 
landmark effort of the EU to bring Member States’ data protection laws into greater 
harmony in terms of the practical implementation of rules based upon common 
principles. Besides protecting personal data, the Directive also aimed to assist the 
completion of the internal market in the EU through facilitating the ‘free movement of 
personal data’ within the EU, and by establishing criteria for the transfer of personal 
data to non-EU countries.  
 
As the name suggests, the DPA  is primarily concerned with the ‘processing’ of 
personal data, where processing includes any use, disclosure, retention, storage, 
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holding or collection of such data. However, not all forms of personal information are 
personal data, and many manual (paper) files held in the private sector are not 
subject to the Act. In relation to the public sector, all personal information is personal 
data, but the protection afforded by the Act to personal information in manual files is 
usually limited to the right of access to personal data and the correction of 
inaccuracies.  
 
The DPA sets out the circumstances under which such data can be processed by 
both public authorities and private organisations. According to Schedule 1 of the 
DPA, any individual or organisation engaged in the handling of personal data is 
required to ensure that all such data are: 
 
(1) Fairly and lawfully processed 
(2) Processed for limited purposes 
(3) Adequate, relevant and not excessive 
(4) Accurate and up to date 
(5) Not kept for longer than is necessary 
(6) Processed in line with rights of data subjects under the Act 
(7) Secure, and 
(8) Not transferred to other countries without adequate protection.  
 
In practice, the first of these data protection principles – the requirement that the 
processing of personal data be fair and lawful – aims to ensure that individuals and 
organisations have legitimate reasons for collecting personal data, that they are open 
with data subjects about how that information will be used, and that they do not do 
anything unlawful with the data. In order to ensure that the storage and processing of 
personal data are consistent with this principle and both open and transparent, the 
Act establishes a system of notifications. Under this system, all organisations 
engaged in the handling of personal information are not only required to provide 
individuals with appropriate privacy notices when collecting their personal data, but 
also to notify the ICO of their activity (unless they are exempt under the Act), and to 
provide details of the type of data processing being undertaken (DPA ,1998, Part III). 
This information is then published in the register of data controllers and is available 
for public inspection. Failure to notify is a criminal offence under the Act. The general 
purpose of this system is to ensure that members of the public are able to find out 
who is processing personal information and for what purpose. In particular, the 
system is designed to ensure that the ICO is informed when a data controller 
processes personal data, and that the individuals concerned are made aware of the 
processing and the purposes for which it is being undertaken.  
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Because the DPA is fundamentally concerned with ensuring that organisations do not 
process personal information improperly, the regime established by the Act not only 
provides individuals with information rights that can be enforced by the courts, but 
also enables anyone who believes that his or her personal information is being 
improperly held or used to make a complaint to the ICO.25 According to the Act, the 
Information Commissioner has the power to: 
 
(1) Undertake assessments to ensure that public sector data controllers are 
 complying with the Act 
(2) Serve information notices requiring data controllers to provide the ICO with 
 specified information within a certain time period 
(3) Serve enforcement notices where there has been a breach of the Act, requiring 
 data controllers to take (or refrain from taking) specified steps in order to ensure 
 they comply with the law26 
(4) Prosecute those who commit criminal offences under the Act27 
(5) Conduct inspections to assess whether data controllers’ processing of personal 
 data complies with the law (with their consent, except in the case of central 
 government departments and some public authorities, where consent is not 
 needed), and 
(6) Report to Parliament annually or on data protection issues of particular concern 
 as they arise.  
 
According to the Information Commissioner’s Annual Report for 2009–10, most 
complaints brought under the DPA (52 per cent) are resolved informally. In the 17 per 
cent of cases in which a decision notice was served, however, those notices were 
only upheld by the Information Tribunal 23 per cent of the time, with the remaining 
notices either being partially upheld (31 per cent) or not upheld (46 per cent). This 
suggests that while the existing system of enforcement is working reasonably well on 
an informal level, the Tribunal has not been especially willing to force individuals and 
organisations to change their data processing practices.  
 
Although it is clear that the DPA provides considerable protections for information 
privacy, it nonetheless has serious limitations. In part, the problem is one of 
definition. It can be argued, for example, that the definition of ‘sensitive data’ in the 
DPA needs to be re-considered, particularly in relation to the increased use of 
biometric data – fingerprints, retina and iris patterns, voice samples etc. – by the 
state and private sector. As a result of the decision in S. & Marper, an actual DNA 
sample, as well as any profile gained from the sample, must be regarded as personal 
data. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the definition of personal information 
contained in the Act can be stretched to provide the protection such data deserves. 
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There is also the question of enforcement and compliance. Although the ICO’s 
enforcement powers were recently expanded so that it can now order organisations 
to pay fines of up to £500,000 for serious breaches of the DPA, in general its powers 
remain relatively limited when compared with regulators in some other jurisdictions.28 
For example, although the Information Commissioner now has the power to inspect 
government departments and certain public authorities, private sector inspections 
can only be carried out with the permission of the relevant data controller. As the 
House of Lords noted in 2009, the need for permission limits the ability of the ICO to 
protect information privacy and undermines the deterrent power of the DPA (House 
of Lords, 2009, para. 232). In contrast, in the Republic of Ireland the DPA grants the 
Irish Data Protection Commissioner much stronger inspection powers,29 and the 
power to conduct routine audits of data controllers, with or without their permission.  
 
In addition to granting relatively limited enforcement powers to the ICO, the DPA also 
sets out a broad range of exemptions. Under Part IV of the Act, for example, when an 
individual’s personal data is being held and processed for the purpose of 
safeguarding national security, the general data protection principles do not apply, 
nor do the data subject rights or other obligations laid down in Parts II, III, or V. In 
some cases much narrower, key exemptions also exist regarding matters of crime 
and taxation, and in relation to issues of health, education and social work. While the 
Act sets out the conditions under which these exemptions can be invoked, in the 
case of national security in particular, the decision as to whether the personal data in 
question is covered by the Act rests with either a Minister of the Crown or the 
Secretary of State. Given that one of the reasons for regulating the collection and 
processing of personal data is to protect individuals from unwanted or overzealous 
state surveillance, it can be argued that providing elected officials with such broad 
powers substantially undermines both the effectiveness and the symbolic value of the 
regime as a whole.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the DPA is primarily concerned with questions of 
data collection and processing, and not information privacy per se. Indeed, it is 
significant that the word ‘privacy’ does not appear anywhere in the text of the DPA. 
As a result, even if the limitations identified in this section were addressed, it is 
unlikely that the Act could provide the level of protection for information privacy 
needed in light of the threats discussed in earlier chapters of this report. Although 
there has been considerable debate over what constitutes personal data for the 
purposes of the Act, it is clear that the term is much narrower than the idea of private 
information, or the meaning of privacy, as discussed earlier in this report. As a result, 
it is difficult to see how the DPA – even if substantially amended – could by itself 
provide the basis for a more comprehensive framework for the protection of 
information privacy in the UK.  
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Personal data protection in the European Union – proposals for reform 
As stated above, the DPA came about to give domestic effect to the landmark EU 
data protection directive. However, after 15 years, the European Commission has 
brought forth a communication outlining steps to develop a more comprehensive and 
coherent legislative framework, to protect individuals' data, including a revised 
Directive requiring national legislative changes.30 The Commission will propose 
legislation in 2011 aimed at revising the legal framework for data protection with the 
objective of strengthening the EU's stance in protecting the personal data of the 
individual in the context of all EU policies, including law enforcement and crime 
prevention, taking into account the specificities of these areas. Non-legislative 
measures, such as encouraging self-regulation and exploring the feasibility of EU 
privacy seals, will be pursued in parallel. This revision is intended to correct 
deficiencies in the original and in national transpositions in the light of experience 
with implementation, and of new, globalising developments in the world of 
information processing, and reverse the drifting apart of national approaches that had 
occurred over this period of time. Individuals’ fundamental rights would be 
strengthened, especially their right to the protection of personal data. It would 
enhance individuals’ control over their data, including rights of access, rectification 
and deletion, and provide greater transparency. These enhancements would be in 
keeping with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,31 which repeats the older right 
to a private and family life but also adds a right to the protection of personal data.  
The UK government to date has been cautious in its approach to the proposed 
reforms. However, the discussions around new EU proposals and the implementation 
of any subsequent EU legislation at the national level, together with non-legislative 
measures, will provide an important opportunity to update and enhance individual 
data protection measures.  
 
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 
As has been mentioned earlier in this report, in order for individuals to be able to 
protect their privacy and maintain control over their personal information, they must 
be able to know how that information is being used. While the DPA regulates access 
to personal information, the major piece of legislation governing the access to 
information generally in England and Wales (and for some Scottish bodies) is the 
FOIA, which came into force in January 2005; Scotland has a separate but largely 
comparable Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act (FOISA) 2002. Under the Act, 
individuals have a right to request information held by a public authority, provided 
that it does not directly pertain to them (the right to personal information being 
provided by the DPA 1998). Requests can be made either by letter or email, and 
according to the Act the public authority must inform the applicant whether it in fact 
holds that information – and supply it if also requested – within 20 working days. 
Crucially, the Act is retroactive and as a result applies to all government departments 
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and publicly funded bodies and all information held by them. Although the FOIA is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, it is administered and enforced by the ICO, 
with decisions about its application and the implications of breach being dealt with by 
the Information Tribunal. Regulation under the Scottish Act is the responsibility of the 
Scottish Information Commissioner.  
 
In many respects, the introduction of the FOIA marked a significant development in 
the protection of information privacy in the UK. By extending the rights of access 
already established under the DPA, the Act has helped to make government and 
public sector data use more open and transparent. Yet while the FOIA has a broad 
ambit, the obligations placed on public authorities by the Act are – in common with 
the DPA – subject to a wide range of exemptions. These exemptions are listed in 
Part II of the Act and include information that is required for safeguarding national 
security (section 24(1)), information that might prejudice the prevention or detection 
of crime (section 31(1)(a)), and information that may endanger the physical or mental 
health of any individual (section 38(1)(a)). Significantly, the FOIA also creates two 
exemptions for personal data about the applicant. The first applies if the applicant is 
the data subject; then the appropriate mechanism for acquiring such personal data is 
via the subject access right of the DPA. If the applicant is not the data subject, then 
the public authority has to assess whether publication of the personal data (via 
disclosure under the FOI regime) would breach a data protection Principle. If it does 
breach a Principle, then the personal data cannot be accessed by the requester, and 
the privacy of the data subject is maintained. In contrast, in Scotland the test for 
release of personal data under the FOISA centres on whether the public interest in 
disclosure outweighs the public interest in exempting the data from disclosure. A 
further limitation to the effectiveness of FOI has been the limited number of 
organisations to which it applies. Some key bodies, such as the Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO), have not been subject to its provisions, although the 
Government now plans to include them. 
 
It is important to note that both the DPA and FOI regimes have to deal with the vexed 
question of what constitutes ‘personal data’; clarity on this point has been more often 
aided by rulings under the freedom of information regimes. When viewed in 
combination with the DPA, the FOIA helps to increase the transparency of public 
bodies and makes it more difficult for them to engage in unauthorised forms of 
surveillance and personal data collection as information about these activities can be 
the subject of requests for information (for example, policies towards surveillance). 
For example, under the FOIA an individual could request information about future 
government plans routinely to monitor personal emails, and then make a request 
under the DPA to determine whether their own email has actually been monitored 
(assuming none of the various exceptions apply in either case). 
INFORMATION PRIVACY IN THE UK 
35 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
Introduced as a replacement for the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and 
parts of the Police Act 1977, RIPA – and RIPSA, its counterpart in Scotland – 
governs the exercise of surveillance powers by the police and other public bodies. In 
essence, RIPA was enacted to ensure that the exercise of these surveillance powers 
does not infringe upon the right to respect for private and family life contained in the 
HRA, and the Act contains a wide range of provisions covering such diverse activities 
as the interception of communications, wiretapping, and the surveillance of private, 
semi-private, and public spaces. Because the rules relating to each of these areas 
are extensive and often highly complex, it is beyond the scope of this report to 
provide anything more than a basic summary of the relevant provisions, with a 
particular focus on the implications for information privacy in each case. 
 
In simple terms, RIPA helps to protect information privacy in two key ways. First, it 
establishes a regulatory framework for the interception of communications by the 
police, and second, it limits the circumstances in which the police can undertake 
surveillance of private residences or individuals in public. As regards the interception 
of communications, the key provision of RIPA is section 1(1), which makes it a crime 
for anyone to intercept a communication that takes place over a public network 
without lawful authority.32 Given that telephone calls, posted mail, email, and 
voicemail are all regarded as things capable of being intercepted under the Act, on its 
face section 1(1) provides considerable protection for information privacy, However, 
according to section 5(3) of the Act, the Secretary of State can issue a warrant 
empowering the police to intercept a communication provided the surveillance 
proposed is proportionate, necessary, and: 
 
(1) In the interests of national security 
(2) For the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime 
(3) For the purpose of safeguarding the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, 
or 
(4) For the purpose, in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be 
equivalent to those in which he would issue a warrant by virtue of paragraph (b), 
of giving effect to the provisions of any international mutual assistance 
agreement. 
 
Although the legislative regime as regards the interception of communications is 
generally clear, some questions remain unresolved. Interestingly, it has been held 
that the unintended monitoring of a mobile phone call by the police – as a result, for 
example, of that mobile phone coming within range of a covert surveillance device 
being used for some other purpose – does not constitute an interception provided the 
call is not recorded.33 Given that this data would not be personal data under section 1 
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of the DPA (as it is not ‘recorded’), there is no obvious remedy available to an 
individual whose privacy has been violated in this way. Equally curious is the fact that 
information obtained by foreign authorities outside of the UK is admissible as 
evidence provided it was intercepted lawfully in that jurisdiction.34 Why such evidence 
should be admitted – when equally lawful evidence obtained domestically is not – is 
unclear. 
 
In terms of information privacy, it is also important to distinguish between surveillance 
carried out on a private communications network and that undertaken on a public 
network. According to section 4 of RIPA, any organisation (including public 
authorities) can lawfully intercept telephone calls or emails made on their own private 
network provided the interception is for the purpose of monitoring the conduct of their 
business. Given that many people communicate through private networks, this 
exception to the general prohibition contained in section 1 constitutes a serious gap 
in the protection of information privacy. Furthermore, under section 1(6) a person or 
organisation in control of a private communications network may have lawful 
authority to intercept and monitor calls and emails, provided the users of that system 
have given their consent, either explicitly or implicitly (for example, by accepting such 
monitoring as one of the terms of their employment).35 
 
In addition to the general privacy restrictions imposed by Article 8 of the ECHR, RIPA 
also governs much of the surveillance of private, semi-private, and public spaces. 
Not only does the Act set out the circumstances under which certain public 
authorities – most notably the police – can engage in surveillance activities, it also 
provides a framework for the authorisation and review of those activities by the Office 
of the Surveillance Commissioner (OSC). According to section 48(2) of the Act, 
surveillance is defined as: 
 
(a) Monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their 
conversations or their other activities or communications 
(b) Recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of 
surveillance, and 
(c) Surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device. 
 
Under the Act, surveillance may be defined as directed or intrusive, and this definition 
has implications for whether a particular type of surveillance can be authorized. 
Although the definitions of directed and intrusive surveillance are somewhat 
confusing, it is possible to define them as follows: 
 
Surveillance is directed if: 
(1) It comprises covert observation or monitoring by whatever means 
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(2) It is for the purpose of a specific investigation or specific operation (any crime or 
other offence), and 
(3) It will or is likely to obtain private information about any person, not just the 
subject of the operation. 
 
Surveillance is intrusive if: 
(1) It is covert 
(2) It is carried out on any residential property or in any private vehicle, and 
(3) It involves the presence of an individual on the premises or in the vehicle, or the 
use of a surveillance device.36 
 
It is worth noting that the structure of these definitions is in many ways typical of the 
Act. Although RIPA is now the primary means by which police surveillance is 
regulated in the UK – and is therefore legislation that most police officers are 
required to be familiar with – in many places it is poorly drafted and its overall 
structure is far from clear. Although legislative clarity is something that should be 
strived for in all areas of the law, it can be argued that it is particularly important 
where fundamental rights such as the right to privacy are at stake. 
 
Generally speaking, where an individual’s residence or vehicle is placed under covert 
surveillance, that surveillance will be regarded as intrusive for the purposes of the 
Act. As a consequence, the police can only place an individual’s home under 
surveillance once they have obtained authorisation from the OSC.37 Difficulties arise, 
however, in cases where it is unclear whether a building or some other private space 
constitutes a residence for the purposes of the Act. Equally problematic is the 
situation where an individual who is being followed under a directed surveillance 
authorisation enters a residence. Under the provisions of RIPA, it seems clear that 
intrusive surveillance authorisation would be required, although this can be granted 
by an authorising officer under section 36(3) prior to approval being gained from the 
OSC if the matter is deemed to be sufficiently urgent. Such examples highlight the 
ambiguities created by the distinction the Act draws between directed and intrusive 
surveillance. Although many police forces advise their officers and authorising 
officers to take a conservative approach to surveillance – and to seek approval for 
intrusive surveillance whenever they are in doubt – the current system of 
authorisation still leaves open the possibility of serious errors and the inadvertent use 
of otherwise illegal surveillance techniques.  
 
Where covert surveillance is being undertaken by the police or a public authority in a 
public place (such as a street or a park), the question of whether RIPA authorisation 
is required will depend on whether the surveillance in question can be categorised as 
either directed or intrusive. For example, according to paragraph 1.4 of the Covert 
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Surveillance Code of Practice, the police must obtain a surveillance authorisation if 
they intend to use an existing public area CCTV system as part of a pre-planned 
surveillance operation.38 As a consequence, the police cannot simply take control of 
a CCTV camera in order to follow a particular individual or vehicle, unless that 
surveillance is part of the day-to-day operation of the system. 
 
As has already been noted in this report, the growing use of public area CCTV 
systems constitutes one of the major threats to information privacy in the UK. 
Although the vast majority of CCTV schemes operating in the UK have their own 
codes of practice (often based on the CCTV Code issued by the ICO), as will be 
discussed in the next chapter these informal codes are not legally binding and do not 
confer any rights on individuals who have been made the subject of unwarranted 
public area surveillance (other than a limited right of access to the images recorded). 
As a consequence, although a code may prohibit operators from following an 
individual unless it is for a particular purpose (such as the prevention of crime), if the 
surveillance is not recorded then an individual who feels they have been unjustly 
targeted has no obvious remedy under the law.  
 
In part, this situation arises because the law does not generally protect privacy rights 
in public places. Although once an individual’s activities are recorded and issues of 
data protection come into play, the current law does not regard the mere observation 
of an individual in public as an infringement of their Article 8 right to privacy.39 It can 
be argued, however, that even observation without recording can seriously infringe 
upon an individual’s privacy in public, insofar as an important aspect of that privacy is 
the ability to act anonymously and without fear of being watched. This is a point that 
has been stressed by the Council of Europe, which stated in 2007 that: 
 
Video surveillance of public areas by public authorities or law enforcement 
agencies can constitute an undeniable threat to fundamental rights such 
as the right to privacy... and [to the individual’s] right to benefit from 
specific protection regarding personal data collected by such 
surveillance... it is recommended that specific regulations should be 
enacted at both international and national level in order to cover the 
specific issue of video surveillance by public authorities of public areas as 
a limitation of the right to privacy. (European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law (Venice Commission) 2007, paras. 79 and 81) 
 
Furthermore, the fact that individuals may be subjected to routine surveillance 
without their knowledge – as is the case where public area CCTV cameras are covert 
– may have a significant ‘chilling effect’ on free speech and militate against the use of 
public spaces for political gatherings or protest activities. Although a statutory regime 
to regulate CCTV was called for by the House of Lords (House of Lords, 2009, para. 
219), the Committee’s recommendation was not accepted by the Government at the 
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time.40 The current Government has, however, indicated that it may support a 
statutory system of CCTV regulation, although at the time of writing no further details 
or timeframe had been announced.  
 
Returning to the operation of RIPA, it is clear that although the regulatory regime it 
establishes is designed to ensure that the use of police surveillance is consistent with 
the rights set out in Article 8 of the ECHR, this regime suffers from a number of major 
shortcomings. First and foremost, because the legislation is extremely complex, there 
has been considerable confusion within the ranks of the police as to its scope and 
application. According to a Review of RIPA commissioned by ACPO in 2004, the 
legislation is marred by ambiguity, and its chief provisions are open to a variety of 
interpretations. This problem is compounded by the fact that RIPA also preserves 
(with amendments) Part 111 of the Police Act – which deals with interference with 
property – and the Intelligence Services Act 1984. As a result, it has led to the 
development of what ACPO regard as an unnecessary level of bureaucracy and a 
lack of clear guidance for Senior Investigating Officers. 
 
This is a view that has been echoed by the courts. The Court of Appeal has, for 
example, labelled RIPA ‘a particularly puzzling statute’ (R v W [2003] EWCA Crim 
1632). Similarly, Lord Bingham in the House of Lords described the Act as 
‘perplexing’, and noted that ‘the trial judge and the Court of Appeal found it difficult to 
‘construe the provisions of the Act with confidence, and the House has experienced 
the same difficulty’.41 As mentioned earlier, it should also be noted that the Act has 
given rise to an unprecedented number – over 30 – statutory instruments, which now 
have to be consulted in order fully to understand its remit and powers.42 
 
Organisations such as Liberty and JUSTICE have also repeatedly expressed 
concerns over the system of authorisation established under RIPA, and the fact that 
it is not subject to direct judicial oversight. This is a point that was emphasised by Dr 
Eric Metcalfe in his evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution: 
 
RIPA powers are often self-authorising with lower level communications 
data powers being authorised internally and even the highest level 
interception powers only requiring the authority of a government minister. 
This can be contrasted with the USA where, historically, there has always 
been independent judicial authorisation at the heart of the US surveillance 
process. (House of Lords, 2009, para. 160) 
 
Indeed, the fact that authorisation for surveillance activities is done ‘internally’ 
continues to be a concern for the courts. In the case of Re McE [2009], for example, 
the House of Lords held that internal authorisation was inappropriate where the 
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surveillance interferes with legal professional privilege – in effect saying that such 
circumstances are as sensitive as when surveillance is conducted in a home or 
private vehicle (Re McE [2009] UKHL 15).  
 
A further concern has been the growing use of RIPA powers by local authorities. 
According to the Interception of Communications Commissioner (2010), in 2008 
public bodies made 525,130 requests for communications data under RIPA, with 
1,765 of these being made by local authorities (Interception of Communications 
Commissioner, 2010 ,pp. 8 and 15). Given that there is evidence to suggest that 
many local authorities lack the expertise needed to interpret the provisions of the Act, 
these statistics are worrying. As noted by the Chief Surveillance Commissioner 
(2008, pp.12-13), local authorities tend to resort to covert activity as a last resort but 
when they do they ‘have a tendency to expose lack of understanding of the 
legislation’ and there is a ‘serious misunderstanding of the concept of proportionality’. 
This has led to a number of high profile instances of what Big Brother Watch – an 
NGO concerned with issues of privacy in UK – has referred to as abuses of the Act 
(Big Brother Watch, 2010). Notable examples of such abuses include the use of 
RIPA powers to: 
 
• Monitor local authority employees, and to investigate concerns over car parking, 
work times, and sick pay 
• Spy on dog owners and enforce rules against dog fouling 
• Catch individuals suspected of breaking the smoking ban, and  
• Prevent illegal fly tipping. 
 
These problems are compounded by the fact that there are also several other 
statutes that give local authorities and other public bodies the power to access 
communications data: the Social Security Administration Act 1992; the Charities Act 
1993; and the Environmental Protection Act 1990. As noted by Liberty (2010, pp.70-
1): 
Having powers spread across the statute book also means appropriate 
supervision and safeguards are diluted and it increases the likelihood that 
personal data is being accessed inappropriately.43 
 
Although RIPA does provide a level of protection for information privacy in the UK, as 
is the case with the DPA, the regulatory framework it establishes is clearly 
characterised by a number of serious gaps, deficiencies, and legislative exceptions. 
In addition, because it does not seek to regulate the general use of public area 
surveillance technologies such as CCTV, it only partially strengthens the right to 
respect for private and family life contained in Article 8 of the ECHR, and fails to 
address one of the key threats to information privacy in the UK.  
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Finally, there is the question whether the definitions of surveillance contained in RIPA 
will be able to respond to continuing developments in information technology, social 
networking, and online communication. Does, for example, identifying the websites 
an individual has accessed constitute surveillance? Does RIPA regulate the 
monitoring of chat room discussions by undercover police officers?44 If the police do 
not use technical methods to gain access to a Facebook page, but instead do so by 
way of a ‘fake’ online identity, does this require authorisation?45 Given that an 
essential part of privacy is the ability to control access to one’s information, it can be 
argued that the use of electronic or other measures to circumvent access controls 
and privacy settings is a form of surveillance that should require authorisation.  
 
Other statutory privacy protections and limitations on the sharing of personal 
information 
At present there is no general statutory power that permits public bodies to share 
data, and as such according to the principles of administrative law, public bodies can 
disclose personal information only if they have been granted the power to do so by 
statute. Although this restriction may appear to be clear, difficulties arise when it is 
possible to infer a power to share information from some other explicit statutory 
power. For example, according to section 111(1) of the Local Government Act 1972, 
local authorities have the power to do anything that will facilitate, or is conducive or 
incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions.46 Given that it is an accepted 
principle of administrative law that express powers should be interpreted in such a 
way as to authorise actions that are incidental to them, it is easy to see how a local 
authority may regard itself as authorised to share various forms of personal 
information with other government bodies. Although any such sharing must comply 
with the rules established under the DPA and the principles of the HRA, the fact that 
there is no specific regime that regulates the sharing of personal information within 
government is cause for concern.47 Not only can the absence of clear, uniform rules 
lead to variances in practice, it is also impossible for individuals to know with any 
degree of certainty the conditions under which personal information held about them 
might be shared.48  
 
The position as regards data sharing is even less clear when it comes to actions of 
government departments. As is the case with public bodies, a government 
department is only permitted to share personal data if it is authorised to do so by law. 
This legal authority may come from statute but also from the common law or the royal 
prerogative. As the Ministry of Justice (then the Department of Constitutional Affairs) 
acknowledged in 2003 in its guidance on public sector data sharing (DCA, 2003), the 
law in this area is complex, and it may be possible for a government department to 
share data based on the common law or royal prerogative even if a power to share 
data cannot be reasonably implied from some explicit statutory provision. 
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In addition to the rules of breach of confidence and administrative law, there are a 
range of other statutory provisions that prohibit the disclosure of certain types of 
information by public bodies and government departments. For the most part, these 
are based on obligations of confidence and include (DCA, 2003, Section 5, para. 6): 
 
(1) Medical confidentiality, according to the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967 and 
the Access to Medical Reports Act 1988 
(2) Information supplied in connection with legal proceedings, according to the 
established rules of court 
(3) Health and safety, according to sections 27 and 28 of the Health and Safety at 
Work Etc Act 1974 
(4) Information provided to the Inland Revenue under section 182 of the Finance 
Act 1989 and section 6 and Schedule 1 to the Taxes Management Act 1970 
(5) Information passed to the Child Support Agency as required by section 50 of 
the Child Support Act 1991  
(6) The Human Tissue Act 2004, and 
(7) Information obtained through the exercise of powers under the Companies Act 
2006. 
 
In addition, there are two other notable situations in which public bodies may be 
permitted to share personal information with either another such body or a 
government department. The first of these arises under section 115 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, which gives the power to disclose information when the disclosure 
is necessary or expedient for the purposes of that Act. This is an extremely broad 
provision, and while any such disclosure will be subject to the provisions of the DPA 
and the principles of the HRA, it provides a wide-reaching statutory basis for data 
sharing between public bodies. Similar powers are also provided by section 17 of the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. According to that section, personal 
information can be disclosed provided such a disclosure is connected with a criminal 
investigation or prosecution. While section 17(5) requires that the public body in 
question ensures that the relevant disclosure is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
being pursued (as per the requirements of the HRA and Article 8 of the ECHR), when 
it can be demonstrated that the disclosure or sharing is in fact proportionate, there 
can be no action for breach of confidence.  
 
Although there is a considerable body of legislation governing the sharing of personal 
information, it is nonetheless extremely difficult for individuals to determine when and 
under what circumstances information about them has been disclosed. While the 
DPA gives individuals the right to know what information is held about them, it does 
not explicitly require individuals or organisations to disclose whether that information 
has been shared. As a consequence, even if individuals are able to ascertain that a 
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particular organisation holds personal or confidential information about them, they 
cannot be certain that the information in question has not been passed on. This lack 
of transparency represents a significant flaw in the current regulatory framework and 
potentially undermines many of the advances made by both the DPA and the HRA in 
terms of the protection of information privacy. 
 
4.4 Common law protections 
In addition to the general right to respect for private and family life provided by the 
HRA and the various statutory provisions and rules surrounding the collection, 
storage and processing of personal information, the common law also offers 
individuals a degree of privacy protection through the tort of breach of confidence.49 
Although the majority of cases in which breach of confidence is likely to be raised 
centre on disputes over trade secrets or government information, it is well 
established that the action is also available where the information in question is 
personal or non-commercial in nature. As a consequence, where an individual’s 
personal information has been passed to a third party without his or her consent, 
then an action for breach of confidence may be available, provided the court is 
satisfied that the information in question was of a private or confidential nature.50 In 
addition, following the decision of Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22, 
there may also be recourse to action for ‘misuse of private information’. 
 
Although it has been argued that the courts should go further and develop a new tort 
of privacy based on principles drawn from the law of breach of confidence, there are 
considerable problems associated with such an approach. First and foremost, there 
is a danger that – because of the high cost of civil litigation and the fact that legal aid 
is rarely available for private actions – any new tort of privacy will only be accessible 
to the wealthy. In addition, it is unclear as to what sorts of compensation would be 
available in such cases, particularly where the individual does not have a 
commercially valuable reputation to protect or has not suffered physical damage or 
psychological harm as a result of the privacy invasion. Finally, there is also danger 
that judicial activism in this area will only serve to make the existing law even more 
fragmented, and undermine the case for improved statutory regulation. Moreover, 
judicial activism is necessarily jurisdiction-specific. As a consequence, while the law 
may develop through the courts in England, this does not necessarily lead to legal 
change in Scotland or Northern Ireland, with the result that protection in the UK 
becomes further fragmented. For all of these reasons, although it may be tempting to 
look to the courts for greater protection of information privacy, it is clear that the 
common law cannot provide the sort of overarching and coherent privacy framework 
that is currently needed in the UK. 
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4.5 Guidelines, codes of practice, and ‘soft law’ 
In addition to the laws discussed above, and other statutory measures, there are also 
significant elements of ‘soft law’, including codes of practice and guidance issued by 
regulators and other bodies. These instruments vary in their degree of formality and 
binding force, and represent an important part of the overall regulation and protection 
of information privacy in the UK. Given the close relationship between the operation 
of ‘soft law’ and the role of regulators, these protections are discussed in detail in the 
next chapter, which focuses on alternative approaches to the protection and 
promotion of information privacy.  
 
4.6 Weaknesses of the current approach 
Although information privacy is protected by a wide range of laws and regulations in 
the UK, the current regime suffers from a number of significant weaknesses. First, 
because the law has tended to develop in an irregular and largely sporadic fashion, 
there are substantial gaps in the information privacy protections offered to individual 
citizens. This is due to the fact that legal reform in this area is typically reactive in 
character, with the law responding to rapid and often unexpected changes in both the 
technological and political landscape of privacy, surveillance, and data sharing. For 
example, concerns about the protection of information privacy in the context of 
advanced computer technology were behind many of the regulatory provisions 
introduced by the DPA and RIPA. However, in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7, the 
expansion of data-monitoring powers has been the focus of a great deal of legislative 
activity. In particular, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 undermines 
both of the earlier pieces of legislation in a number of key respects, most notably as 
regards the obligations of internet service providers to retain records of internet use.  
 
Equally, although concern about the widespread use of CCTV has increased in 
recent years, public area surveillance remains relatively unregulated when compared 
to other, similarly intrusive forms of state surveillance and information gathering. As a 
result of this reactive approach, the overall system of surveillance and data collection 
regulation that has emerged in the UK is at times internally inconsistent, and could 
best be described as piecemeal. Furthermore, because the law has struggled to keep 
pace with the expansion of surveillance in the UK, the resources and powers granted 
to regulators have begun to look increasingly inadequate in light of the challenges 
they face. 
 
Secondly, the rules and regulations that govern information privacy and the use of 
personal information are not based on any single rationale or set of stated principles. 
In part, this is a result of the fact that these laws have developed through a 
combination of case law, legislation, and informal attempts at self-regulation. The 
absence of clearly defined, overarching principles means that each piece of 
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legislation, line of judicial precedent, or code of practice has to be understood and 
interpreted within its own specific context. This can make the task of determining 
what rules apply to any given form of surveillance or data collection complex and 
time-consuming, and increases the likelihood that individuals will have their privacy 
infringed or their personal data misused. 
 
Finally, due to its diverse and de-centralised nature, no single body or individual is 
responsible for protecting information privacy in the UK, or for overseeing the system 
of surveillance and data collection regulation in the UK. At present, the ICO, the 
OSC, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, the Scottish Information 
Commissioner, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the various directors 
of the security services, and the Secretary of State all share responsibility for 
monitoring and regulating surveillance practices and technologies, and/or for 
ensuring that information privacy is respected by the organisations within their 
jurisdiction. While there is some communication between these bodies, there is little 
evidence to suggest that there is much inter-agency coordination, either in terms of 
oversight of surveillance practices or the administration and enforcement of penalties 
for non-compliance. As a result, it is difficult to assess whether information privacy is 
being adequately protected, or whether there are substantial gaps in the legal regime 
that need to be filled by new laws or regulations.  
 
4.7 Summary 
This section has provided a brief overview of the various statues, regulations, and 
common law rules that govern individual privacy and the use of personal information 
in the UK. Although it is difficult to generalise about such a diverse and complex area 
of law, it is possible to identify a number of key trends in the recent development of 
privacy laws in the UK. While it is true that the HRA, the DPA, the FOIA, and RIPA – 
and the Scottish versions of the last two – have brought about significant changes in 
the way in which government and public authorities think about information privacy, it 
is clear that more attention needs to be paid to ensuring greater consistency in the 
way in which information privacy issues are understood and strengthening the legal 
regime and the powers of the regulatory agencies responsible for enforcing existing 
laws and regulations. 
 
Another trend that has implications for the protection of information privacy in the UK 
is the continuing expansion in the surveillance apparatus of the state – most notably 
on the grounds of national security, prevention of crime, and public sector efficiency. 
Given that this expansion has been accompanied by only a relatively small increase 
in the powers or resources available to regulatory authorities such as the ICO or the 
various surveillance commissioners, the question arises as to whether the existing 
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system of information privacy protections is being properly enforced, or is indeed 
adequate.  
 
Finally, there appears to be a continuing reluctance on the part of government to 
consider the possibility of widespread reform of the existing law so as to rationalise 
the existing piecemeal structure and create a single, comprehensive regulatory 
framework for surveillance and data collection. 
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5. Complementary approaches for enhancing privacy  
 
5.1 Introduction 
General or sector-specific privacy law is necessary, but not sufficient for privacy 
protection. To ensure compliance, laws depend on the efforts of a regulatory agency 
such as a data protection authority and other mechanisms operating within a legal 
framework across society, in government and in business organisations. Measures 
that complement statutory or common-law mechanisms have developed over many 
years as additions to the array of instruments for personal data protection. Some 
would argue that they are more effective than legal instruments and are more 
sensitive to the variety of information contexts and practices. Others remain 
suspicious that these instruments can only weaken protection, especially if they 
substitute for law. This Chapter examines some leading complementary approaches 
and assesses their contribution to the aim of protecting privacy and human rights. 
These approaches include codes of practice, privacy-enhancing tools and modes of 
evaluation that are built into the design of information systems, and the raising of 
public awareness. Our aim is to describe these instruments and point out their strong 
and weak points. We begin with a general explanation before examining the UK 
situation. 
 
5.2 Self-regulatory approaches 
The wide range of self-regulatory instruments cannot be discussed here.51 However, 
amongst the most important are codes of practice or conduct and standards. They 
are derived from a general data protection law and usually operate in an information-
governance context within public or private organisations. With the recognition that 
statutory law may be inadequate to protect information privacy by itself, codes have 
come to be regarded with greater favour by data protection policy-makers as 
adjuncts to legal regulation. Sometimes, however, codes of practice exist in the 
absence of specific or sectoral law governing information practices, as in the USA, 
which lacks an omnibus data protection law. In some countries – the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, Canada and the UK provide examples – codes or 
standards play a more integral part of a statutory regime and may be overseen by the 
regulatory body.  
 
The strength of data-protection codes, as of other self-regulatory instruments, lies 
largely in their tailoring of general legal provisions or ethical precepts to the 
circumstances of an industrial or business sector (for example, banking), a 
technology (for example, smart cards), a profession (for example, market 
researchers), or a process (for example, direct marketing). Privacy protection and – 
where it exists – the law are thus more likely to be understood in the concrete terms 
current in these sectors. It is more likely to address the specific contexts in which 
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individuals’ personal data is processed. The process of developing a code in 
conjunction with the advice of interested parties and regulators may be valuable in 
helping data controllers appreciate the importance of protecting the privacy of their 
customers or clients. Going further, context-specific guidance based on a code can 
be a useful way of getting managers or employees to implement the fine grain of 
privacy protection.  
 
However, codes have been controversial because they have often been encouraged 
by industries that aim to forestall legislation and who prefer self-regulation to more 
rigorous regulation by statute; they see codes as a less onerous substitute for law 
(US Department of Commerce, 1997). Privacy advocates have therefore distrusted 
self-regulation as a weak form of privacy protection, because it is often perfunctory 
and symbolic, rather than implemented with force. Where codes are adopted 
reluctantly or as a means of regulatory avoidance, they may be a poor substitute for 
rigorously enforced law. In addition, a code’s mechanisms for redress, transparency, 
and sanctions may be wanting, and the ability of a trade association or other ‘peak’ 
organisation – or indeed, a public sector agency – to discipline its member 
organisations, companies, professionals or other staff may be limited. 
 
Therefore, under these conditions self-regulation is unlikely to adhere to privacy-
protection principles unless it takes place within a statutory regime. Moreover, if data 
controllers are not organised into sectors or industries, there is no overarching 
organisation capable of adopting a code that would bind or influence controllers’ 
information-processing activities. Whether the state functions as a single entity or, in 
reality, as a collection of separate organisations, may have an important bearing on 
the usefulness of public sector codes. An important question for this country could be 
whether each central government agency or department should adopt its own code 
of practice pertaining to its functions; whether there should be one for all of them, 
perhaps ‘owned’ by the Cabinet Office; or whether there should be a central push 
and oversight with responsibility and further ‘tailoring’ resting on each organisation.  
 
In the UK, a prominent role was envisaged for codes of practice in the 1978 Lindop 
Report that preceded the passage of the first UK data protection legislation.52 Lindop 
explored options for creating a system of some 50 codes having the force of law and 
as a main activity of an independent data protection authority. In the event, 
subsequent UK data protection legislation did not go down this route – partly 
because it challenged Ministerial powers – but since then there has been a 
development of codes and their incorporation as parts of the regulatory regime. 
 
Codes are integral to the UK data protection regime but have played perhaps a less 
conspicuous role than elsewhere. Some codes have originated within sectors or 
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organisations themselves, public or private, while others are promulgated by the ICO 
following consultation, as is explained below. Among the codes are those for the 
sharing of personal data (currently being revised; see below), employment, the fair 
processing of telecommunications directory information, privacy notices, police 
forces, online privacy, ICO assessment audits, and CCTV. The Audit Commission 
adopted a statutory Code of Data Matching Practice in 2008, applicable to its 
National Fraud Initiative, and Audit Scotland was consulting on one in 2010. Also 
bearing upon privacy are the codes of practice that fall under RIPA, for the 
interception of communications, acquisition and disclosure of communications data, 
covert surveillance and property interference, covert human intelligence, and for the 
investigation of protected electronic information. The Scottish Government has been 
developing a central set of principles for identity-management systems. This is a type 
of code complementing the data protection principles in the context of identity 
management as a specific kind of information use, although with wider applicability.  
 
Section 51 of the DPA requires the Information Commissioner ‘to promote the 
following of good practice by data controllers’. This includes activity with regard to 
codes of practice, whether the code is ordered by the Secretary of State – a 
Government Minister – or whether the Commissioner considers it appropriate to 
prepare and disseminate one. In the former case, the Commissioner lays the draft 
code before each House of Parliament. In the latter case, he must consult with trade 
associations and data subjects or their representatives before issuing the code. But 
he may also encourage trade associations to prepare and disseminate a code, giving 
an opinion on it following consultation. 
 
The coverage that codes provide for areas of potentially privacy-invasive information 
practices is patchy, and the development of a more comprehensive framework for 
their development and implementation has been slow. Codes may have a number of 
shortcomings, including a lack of clear terminology, uncertainty about the intended 
audience, and ambiguity about the relationship between encouraging good practice 
and requiring legal compliance. The code may be imprecisely tailored to the 
circumstances of different data controllers, and may leave unclear the relationship 
between the code and other guidance that relates to data controllers. Moreover, 
public reassurance that a code is obeyed may be unwarranted. While some codes 
are relatively straightforward in applying data protection principles (for example, the 
ACPO code for police forces), others are very – if necessarily – complex in their 
coverage (for example, the employment practices code). 
 
The effectiveness of codes in improving compliance or practice cannot be easily 
assessed, but one value of a code may lie, as mentioned, in the learning process 
through which they are shaped and communicated within an organisation. Another 
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lies in the presumption of adherence, so that ignoring a code may have adverse 
consequences if legal proceedings are brought against a data controller. A third lies 
in the relatively easier processes involved in updating and revision – as with the 
CCTV code, for example – when technologies or other circumstances change, rather 
than having to resort to the parliamentary vagaries of legislative amendment or 
revision.  
 
A code of practice could play a potentially important role with regard to the sharing of 
data, an increasing practice across the public sector that gives rise to concerns about 
privacy, perhaps particularly in terms of individuals’ ability to understand and control 
what happens to their data. The Data Sharing Review Report (Thomas and Walport, 
2008) called for the Information Commissioner to be required to produce and keep 
up-to-date a data-sharing code of practice that would be approved by Parliament. 
This would replace the existing 2007 Framework Code of Practice, which had no 
statutory standing or parliamentary involvement. A statutory code would be an 
authoritative interpretation of data protection principles, establishing standards for 
information sharing. Breaches would not be illegal, but non-compliance would be 
taken into account by the courts and the Information Commissioner in relevant cases. 
The Government accepted that the Commissioner should have the recommended 
statutory duty to develop the code (Ministry of Justice, 2008), and the proposal was 
also endorsed by the House of Lords Constitution Committee in 2009 (House of 
Lords, 2009). 
 
Data-sharing protocols are similar self-regulatory mechanisms that operate within 
legal privacy-protection frameworks in situations where personal data are exchanged 
or shared among agencies of different kinds. In multi-agency partnerships for social 
and health care or community safety, these documents set out the conditions 
governing data sharing among the bodies involved. They may be formal agreements 
made with national guidance, as for example that given by the Home Office with 
reference to multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) following the 
passage of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Bellamy et al., 2008). Protocols, however, 
have often been too elaborate and complicated for frontline service practitioners to 
implement in their daily work. Therefore, their regulatory efficacy – taken by 
themselves – and ability to raise employees’ awareness of privacy issues affecting 
public-service clients – frequently among the most vulnerable individuals, who are 
less capable of protecting their own privacy – may be questionable. 
 
5.3 Designing privacy protection into information systems  
Over the past 20 years, there has been an increasing worldwide interest in protecting 
information privacy through the use of technologies operating either at the 
organisational and systems end or at the individual’s end of the flow of personal data. 
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Generally known as ‘privacy-enhancing technologies’, or PETs, they offer alternative 
or complementary ways of limiting privacy invasion, but the question whether privacy 
is thereby enhanced, merely maintained, or threatened in unforeseen ways has often 
been debated. PETs offer a way of building privacy into systems, rather than bolting 
them on as expensive and ineffective afterthoughts. 
 
PETs may help data controllers to comply with many of the requirements of privacy 
laws and principles. They can preserve anonymity and confidentiality, provide 
physical security for data, give greater control and choice to individuals, and harness 
the rule-making properties of information technology (for example, software ‘code’) to 
the cause of privacy protection (Lessig, 1999; Reidenberg, 1998). PETs, however, 
should not simply be equated with data-security technologies – for example, 
passwords, locks, and encryption – in that those devices do not address the 
legitimacy of data collection, storage, or exchange, which are all integral parts of 
information privacy laws and principles, as well as of the right to privacy (Burkert, 
1997). 
 
It is less important to identify and describe particular PETs than to note how they can 
be put into practice. Some are built into the design of systems and networks (for 
example, default settings governing what data are collected) and may be 
incorporated into policies for public-service provision (for example, public-key 
cryptography, secure websites, and biometrics – albeit controversial in terms of 
privacy). Others are in the hands of individuals themselves as they seek to control 
their data and protect their own privacy (for example, anonymous web browsers and 
‘cookie’ filters).  
 
In terms of privacy protection, strong or weak forms of these instruments can be 
found. As with codes, PETs can give a false sense of reassurance, or detract from 
more stringent means of protecting privacy through legal requirements and 
enforcement that are necessary. PETs are not a ‘technological fix’ for problems of 
regulation, parliamentary scrutiny, or governmental self-restraint. Their effectiveness 
may depend on how they are implemented. This may be left to the market, giving 
signals to information technologists and businesses to incorporate PETs in their 
system architectures and commercial practices. It may be a matter for public policy, 
mandating PETs in IT systems used for public-sector transactions. Or the initiative 
may lie with the general public, demanding technical safeguards and obtaining 
specific consumer privacy tools. In other words, PETs’ contribution depends on 
normative and practical decisions. Despite the enthusiasm for PETs, their 
deployment has faltered: online businesses and consumers have not been 
sufficiently persuaded to develop or demand them (OECD, 2001). The lack of 
recognised standards to guide implementation, uncertainty about the benefits of 
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PETs, absence of managerial recognition of a responsibility to protect privacy, and 
the fear of adopting obsolescent PETs are cited by the ICO as among the reasons for 
reluctance to implement these design solutions (ICO, 2008). 
 
Privacy technology efforts have now been re-presented and promoted at national and 
international levels in terms of ‘privacy by design’ (PbD) (Cavoukian, 2009; ICO, 
2008). This reformulates the PETs philosophy with greater emphasis on system 
architectures rather than the individual’s own implementation or on technical devices 
as such. PbD presses for a comprehensive set of information governance practices, 
standards, and modes of accountability within organisations that process personal 
data. PbD requires organisations to understand and accept the need for proactive 
ways of complying with privacy protection laws and principles. It might also ideally 
require them to have a more nuanced, and perhaps social-psychological, 
understanding of the contexts and situations in which people use technology in their 
relationships with others, including the state (Palen and Dourish, 2003). In the UK, 
emphasis is now also given to articulating the business case for privacy-protective 
business processes and information systems, thus helping to achieve a ‘privacy 
dividend’ (ICO, 2010a). 
 
It is too soon to say whether these initiatives will bear fruit in the public sector where 
PbD and PETs could be mandated in system procurement requirements and 
contribute to the protection of privacy rights. However, the historic lack of success of 
efforts to encourage and cajole organisations, and other reasons, have prompted a 
stronger advocacy of PbD by various authoritative EU sources.53 The European Data 
Protection Supervisor, for example, has most recently pressed for embedding the 
principle of PbD in EU laws and policies at general and sectoral levels of information 
and communication technology within the European Digital Agenda, and in other 
situations. 
 
Privacy impact assessment (PIA) is a related, and increasingly popular, privacy 
protection technique that plays a part in self-regulation through its association with 
design solutions. It can have a key role within statutory regimes: it is legally 
mandated in some countries for new technological systems, including the USA at the 
federal level. PIAs are described as ‘structured assessments of a project’s potential 
impact on privacy, carried out at an early stage’ (Thomas and Walport, 2008, p 31). 
They vary considerably in their implementation in terms of how, when, why, and by 
whom they are undertaken, how comprehensive they are, as well as other factors. 
PIAs are built upon risk assessment but are oriented towards assessing and 
mitigating risks to individual privacy rather than risks to the organisation. However, 
organisations may be prone to misconstruing PIAs as merely a way of assessing and 
mitigating their own legal and financial liability. In the UK, the use of PIAs has been 
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endorsed and promoted by the Information Commissioner (ICO, 2008; ICO, 2009). 
The rash of data breaches in the UK in 2007-08 resulted in a Government report that 
endorsed PIA for government departments (Cabinet Office, 2008). They are not 
required by statute, although the House of Lords has recommended that the DPA be 
amended to make them mandatory (House of Lords, 2009).  
 
If their development involves organisations in a searching analysis, PIAs can help to 
instil a culture of privacy protection. They can also facilitate practical steps in the 
design and deployment of information systems, in the training of staff, and in the 
acceptance of managerial responsibility for privacy. If guided by principles and with 
an eye towards safeguarding privacy rights, they thus may contribute strongly to 
privacy protection independently of legal compliance requirements, and on a broader 
and deeper basis than the law may demand. On the other hand, PIAs are prone to 
perfunctory and box-ticking performance to minimal standards of analysis and 
reporting, rather than in terms of principles. Once again, a deceptive impression may 
be given of the organisation’s willingness and ability to protect the data they collect, 
store, or share, and the PIA may fall short in assessing and mitigating risks of 
adverse impact on privacy. Moreover, in addressing the question how a proposed 
information system could affect privacy or related values, PIAs may place less 
emphasis on the more fundamental question whether the data processing or 
surveillance should happen in the first place.  
 
5.4  Public awareness and education 
Laws, codes, and technological design are insufficient for privacy protection without 
the ability of individuals and groups to help prevent privacy invasions and to press for 
remedial action. Privacy regulators rely on the public and advocacy groups to bring 
pressure to bear upon potential intruders on information privacy, to complain about 
specific violations, and to seek redress. For these purposes, regulators as well as 
others engage in campaigns for raising the level of public awareness about their 
rights and about the way information processing affects them. A public that is more 
aware is arguably more likely to be able to take steps to protect their personal data, 
to assert their right to information privacy, and to seek remedies. 
 
Greater public awareness can be brought about through the promotional efforts of 
regulators, such as the ICO, who provide publicity material, usable websites, and 
guidance to information processors as well as the general public (European 
Commission, 2009). In the UK, the Information Commissioner’s alarm bell about 
‘sleepwalking into a surveillance society’ (Ford, 2004) was followed by a special 
report (Surveillance Studies Network, 2006) that gained prominent media exposure 
and prompted important inquiries by parliamentary committees. Other reports in 
recent years have helped to elevate the issues to prominence (Royal Academy of 
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Engineering, 2007; Liberty, 2007; House of Lords and House of Commons, 2008; 
House of Commons, 2008a, House of Commons, 2008b). 
 
In many countries, the attempt to increase the level of public, as well as 
parliamentary and governmental, awareness and concern about privacy and 
surveillance is spearheaded by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These 
have included general civil liberties and human rights groups as well as more 
specialised groups of privacy advocates and single-issue campaigns concerning, for 
example, identity cards, supermarkets’ use of personal data, health privacy, or 
internet privacy issues. However, compared with pressure group activity in many 
other areas, privacy advocacy as such takes place through under-resourced, loose 
and fragmented networks, with sporadic success (Bennett, 2008). 
 
In the UK, one can identify privacy-related campaigning, publication, and awareness-
raising work undertaken by many NGOs.54 The media sometimes publicise alarming 
examples of privacy invasion and surveillance – for example, ‘snooping’ on parents 
of school-age children – and internet blogging and privacy-advocacy websites alert 
people to dangers of information collection and use. Influence over public opinion 
and policy is hard to measure, but some groups have gained legislative success 
through pressure, contacts with parliamentarians, briefings, as well as contributions 
to drafting Bills and secondary legislation. Many groups have also maintained 
consultative channels to the ICO. The House of Lords has recommended that the 
Government should involve NGOs in the development and implementation of policies 
involving surveillance and data processing that have significant implications for the 
citizen (House of Lords, 2009).  
 
The strength of such efforts at public education and awareness, as well as policy 
influence, is that they are formally independent of political party and governmental 
control. In addition, groups often possess specialist knowledge of technologies, 
business processes, academic and legal research, and sectors of public opinion that 
can be brought to bear upon governmental and business decisions. On the other 
hand, their influence often depends upon how well they capitalise on scandals and 
‘horror stories’ for their campaigning activities and their attempts to influence public 
debate. Moreover, the elusiveness of the meaning of ‘privacy’ and the intricacy of 
issues and problems arising from data activities make it difficult to get messages 
across to the public and politicians, except perhaps with regard to a few dramatic and 
tangible surveillance devices such as CCTV installations. Some of these deficiencies 
may be mitigated to the extent that NGOs and campaigners are seen as ‘within the 
tent’ in terms of policy-making, but that in turn may bring the danger of blunting their 
edge. 
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A further benefit of raising public awareness is that it can bring issues to attention 
that might otherwise be obscured. For example, the question of how information 
privacy is distributed across society – whether it is acceptable in our society for some 
to have more privacy than others – is more likely to be raised and placed on the 
policy agenda through such activities outside government than through official routes. 
Marginalised or vulnerable ethnic and socio-economic groups, and not merely 
individuals, may be ‘privacy-poor’ as well. They may lack the means of recourse to 
legal remedies and the ability to challenge surveillance practices that impinge on 
them, for example as targets for data gathering and monitoring, more than on other 
people. Unless their cause is championed by NGOs, the media, regulators, or 
individual parliamentarians, it is likely to go unheeded. 
 
5.5 Some regulatory developments abroad 
Privacy or data protection laws have proliferated in Europe, North America, and the 
Asia-Pacific region. There are also a variety of relationships between these statutory 
means and the provisions of some national constitutions, charters of human rights, 
and other high-level declarations. National legal instruments for privacy and data 
protection are also shaped by international documents, of which the most prominent 
are those of the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OECD (Council of 
Europe, 1981; OECD, 1981; European Union, 1995), but motives related to free 
trade and the internal market of the EU often compete with the human rights and 
privacy dimensions of these measures.  
 
As in the UK, other countries have had mixed experiences with alternative or 
complementary approaches. Although USA federal agencies are covered by the 
Privacy Act of 1974, self-regulation is most prominently followed as the preferred 
path in the USA for the private sector where the coverage of privacy laws is patchy 
and regulatory ‘watchdog’ machinery is lacking. As suggested earlier, PETs have not, 
so far, fulfilled their promise anywhere although they have been selectively 
implemented; it remains to be seen whether PbD constitutes a lasting improvement. 
Concerning the raising of awareness and the public’s knowledge of their rights and 
what happens to their data, special occasions such as ‘Data Protection Day’ events 
have risen to prominence in the past few years in many countries (Council of Europe, 
2010), although beyond the immediate publicity they gain for privacy protection, their 
long-term effect cannot yet be gauged. If high levels of public awareness and 
vigilance are supposed to act as social support mechanisms underpinning legal and 
formal regulation, it is too soon to tell whether this is taking place. However, some 
surveys indicate relatively high, albeit fluctuating, levels of public concern over the 
protection of their data, perhaps especially online and in social networking 
processes.55 But it is prudent to be cautious about surveys and focus-group research, 
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because of their methodological shortcomings and the inherent difficulty of carrying 
out enquiries into such an elusive and ill-defined value and right as privacy. 
  
An important piece of unfinished international business is the establishment of high-
level standards for privacy protection and for the rights associated with it. These can 
be formal and technical standards, dealing with matters of data security, as 
promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization or other bodies. 
Attempts to go further into information governance and adherence to wider criteria of 
good, privacy-protective practice have met with considerable business resistance. 
  
A recent manifestation of the push towards better standards came in the 2009 Madrid 
Resolution of the world’s privacy and data protection commissioners, supported by 
the 2009 Madrid Declaration of NGOs, privacy advocates, and other organisations 
and persons (Madrid Resolution, 2009; Madrid Declaration, 2009). These called for 
global standards, closely aligned with the conventional data protection principles but 
going further into matters that included better international regulatory co-operation, 
staff training, PIAs, PETs, and other proactive procedures. The Resolution 
emphasised: 
 
the universal nature of the principles and guarantees underlying this right 
[to privacy], and by contributing to a better protection of rights and 
freedoms of individuals in a globalized world, characterised by cross-
border flows of information. 
 
The Declaration went further to call for a moratorium on many forms of surveillance, 
and for: 
 
the establishment of a new international framework for privacy protection, 
with the full participation of civil society, that is based on the rule of law, 
respect for fundamental human rights, and support for democratic 
institutions. 
 
5.6 Summary 
There are many ways of protecting privacy in addition to legal provisions. Some of 
the leading instruments have been outlined, with comments on their efficacy and 
likelihood of doing the work that law itself cannot do. However, it is important to 
emphasise three significant points that will affect any reforms in the safeguarding of 
information privacy rights that might be proposed. The first point is that law is 
essential: without legal specification of privacy rights, other instruments will be busy 
but blind to the main issues at stake, and are likely to be incapable of providing the 
remedies that individuals may need. 
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The second point is that the principles written into law or underpinning it must be – 
and normally are – reflected in the specification of other instruments, which can then 
be seen as reinforcements and complements to the law and not as substitutes for, or 
weaker versions of, privacy laws. For example, the minimisation of personal data 
collection, the several dimensions of the quality of data (accuracy, relevance, non-
excessiveness, and timeliness), and the specificity of purpose for data processing 
are among the principles that should be inscribed in non-statutory mechanisms if 
they are to provide a high degree of protection in conjunction with the law. 
 
The third point is that the art and science of better privacy protection involves 
articulating the various legal and other devices with each other. The aim is to design 
them into a comprehensive protection regime and not leave them simply as a 
piecemeal inventory of measures or ‘tools’ implemented in a disjointed fashion by 
various agents, leaving gaps through which privacy intrusions and the erosion of 
rights may enter. Whose responsibility it should be – and at what levels, from the 
local to the global – to ensure the required integration of instruments and approaches 
is an important question for regulatory governance to address.  
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6. Moving forward  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Commentators have often criticised the gaps and inadequacy of information privacy 
in the US, as compared with the UK and the rest of the EU. Pointing to the EU 
Directive – described in Chapter 4 – and its various national incarnations, they have 
argued that it provides far stronger privacy protections for European citizens and 
residents than those enjoyed by their US counterparts. In large part, this is because it 
covers the private sector as well as the public, and requires a ‘supervisory authority’ 
to enforce the law and perform other important regulatory functions, rather than 
leaving individuals to pursue privacy violations in the courts. Unfortunately, this 
comparison is only partially valid, and dangerously complacent. Not only is it overly 
reliant on a comparison of legislative texts rather than a detailed assessment of how 
protections in these different jurisdictions work in practice, it also underplays the 
extent to which the European approach often lacks the certainty and solidity that a 
rights-based regime requires. Privacy is not best served by the current patchwork of 
laws and other instruments that are in place in the UK today, or by the lack of an 
overarching regulatory framework within which the idea of information privacy could 
play an important part in the protection of this fundamental human right. 
 
In the UK, governments of whatever political party, and parliament, have long 
resisted the enactment of a general privacy law, mainly because they have a vested 
interest in processing personal data in pursuit of their policies. From the 1980s 
onwards, they have only reluctantly and reactively placed data protection law, the 
regulation of investigatory powers, and human rights law on the statute book, 
although there was a spate of legislation late in this period. As far as data protection 
is concerned, both in 1984 and in 1998 governments legislated for fairly minimal 
protection through cumbersome and ambiguous legal provisions that leave too much 
open to interpretation and fortuitous circumstance before privacy invasions can be 
challenged effectively. They have resisted giving more powers and resources to the 
ICO as the main regulator for information privacy, and have only recently begun to 
raise concerns about the rise of the ‘surveillance society’ and the adverse nature of 
many of its effects. Governments have continually given order-making powers to 
Ministers to override privacy restrictions on the way personal data is collected, 
processed, and disclosed. This trend was only recently reversed with the 
abandonment of clause 152 of the Coroners and Justice Bill in 2009, which would 
have created a broad power to share personal data for any governmental ‘policy 
objective’. Parliament has often found itself unwilling or unable to resist policies and 
laws that erode privacy, and has sometimes revealed its inability to understand 
sufficiently the nature and extent of the threats to privacy posed by technologies, 
economic processes, and even well-intentioned political will. The role of NGOs and 
MOVING FORWARD 
59 
individuals in shoring up and pursuing the enforcement of information privacy rights 
has been consistently undervalued. 
 
As discussed in this Chapter and the next, there is a pressing need for reform in the 
area of privacy. In particular, this report argues that more emphasis needs to be 
placed on rationalising existing protections, ensuring greater coherence across 
different sectoral privacy laws, and strengthening the powers of the regulatory 
agencies responsible for enforcing these laws. In addition, this report takes non-legal 
mechanisms and instruments seriously, and aims to embed them more firmly into the 
culture and practices of public and private organisations. 
 
The most important step is to bring the existing array of protective or permissive 
legislation into better and clearer alignment, and to focus it upon purposes more than 
on expediency, and to ensure that human rights are protected. Data protection law 
and practice should be harmonised with human rights law so that, within government 
policy, values beyond information security and the need for effective and efficient 
data processing are more clearly recognised, requiring a broader commitment to 
privacy from those who collect, use, and disclose personal data. The regulatory 
oversight and guidance provided by the investigatory powers regimes need to be 
clarified and made more effective so that those engaged in different forms of 
surveillance have a clearer grasp of the legitimate scope of their powers. The 
juxtaposition of several kinds of Commissioner in the world of surveillance and data 
protection needs reconsideration in terms of the clarity of roles, relationships, and 
resources to provide sufficient safeguards for the public. Gaps in the coverage of 
laws, so that some surveillance domains are inadequately regulated – for example, 
the DNA database and CCTV – need to be remedied through statutory enactment 
guided by existing human rights and data protection legislation.  
 
We have seen how an overview of information privacy’s rationale and conceptual 
basis, along with an assessment of the threats posed to privacy by the development 
of data collection and surveillance, can provide a context for looking at the privacy-
related laws and regulatory regimes currently in place in the UK. We have identified 
key features of the existing system that could form a basis for future privacy 
protections, and pointed out areas of weakness that would need to be overcome if 
privacy regulation were to have a more principled foundation and a more coherent 
structure.  
 
We do not believe that there is one ‘best solution’ for shoring up information privacy 
rights and ensuring that surveillance does not pose a threat to fundamental human 
rights. This Chapter sets out a number of principled and practical approaches that 
could help to achieve these goals. These approaches involve different areas of the 
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law as well as different social and technological means of reform, and seek to identify 
new paths for privacy protection. Although we identify four key approaches, these 
should not be seen as a menu from which one best choice must be made. There is 
much room for debate, one that recognises that some of the approaches – and 
indeed others that could be envisaged – represent different emphases rather than 
clear alternatives to each other.  
 
6.2 Approach One: a principled foundation 
We believe that the protection of information privacy and the regulation of 
surveillance and data collection must be based on a clear, principled foundation that 
is consistent with a commitment to equality and fundamental human rights. 
‘Principles-based regulation’ (PBR), more than ‘rules-based regulation’, has found 
favour as an effective way of regulating privacy, and has been recently advocated in 
the privacy work of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC, 2008). Although 
PBR is characterised by a number of paradoxes that may reduce its attractiveness,56 
relying on principles provides necessary flexibility in a climate of rapid technological 
change and growing threats to privacy, and focuses on achievable outcomes rather 
than the strict enforcement of prescriptive rules. While emphasising principles, the 
ALRC has recommended a hybrid approach that also makes clear the importance of 
clear rules and sectoral regulation. In this approach, rules are provided for sectors 
and fields in which there is a need for clarity about how the principles are to be 
fulfilled. This is achieved through specifications in subordinate regulations, 
supplemented by guidance.  
 
In the UK, Article 8 provides an overarching framework for the protection of privacy, 
and the system of data protection already operates at both the level of eight broad 
principles (see below) and of more specific rules and guidance, although – as in 
many other countries’ systems – it uses a wider range of instruments as well (Bennett 
and Raab, 2006). Whether data protection law as such works well enough in its 
entirety, or needs specific redrafting and better implementation is, at the time of 
writing, a matter for wide consultation and deliberation in the UK and the EU. 
However, the question of the effectiveness of the legal and human rights instruments 
that are involved in UK data protection, and the translation of principles into practice, 
is of considerable interest. 
 
The most prominent and long-standing set of principles in the world of privacy 
protection and information rights are the data protection principles. These are found, 
in one form or another, in the landmark documents mentioned in Chapter 4: the 
OECD Guidelines of 1980, the Council of Europe Convention of 1981, and the 
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. They are also reflected in a large 
number of countries’ national legislation and in ‘fair information practice’ standards 
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where such legislation is absent.57 Approaches to the regulation of data collection 
and processing at both the global (for example, the Madrid Resolution, 2009) and 
lower levels (for example, for identification and verification purposes, as being 
developed by the Scottish Government) draw heavily upon these principles. In light of 
this, questions remain about how helpful these principles are when it comes to 
regulating online activity and uses of personal data that were not envisaged in the 
1980s and 1990s. They nonetheless provide an important and practical starting point 
for thinking about information privacy reform in the UK.  
 
As set out in the UK DPA, Schedule 1, Part I, the data protection principles are as 
follows (abridged): 
 
• Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully […].  
 
• Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with 
that purpose or those purposes. 
 
• Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
 
• Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
 
• Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer 
than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
 
• Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects 
under this Act. 
 
• Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss 
or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
 
• Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate 
level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the 
processing of personal data. 
 
In addition, the DPA gives individuals the right to find out who holds what personal 
data about them, to obtain a copy of it, to correct or erase it if it has been unlawfully 
processed, and to obtain remedies if these access and correction rights have not 
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been complied with. Certain special categories of ‘sensitive’ personal data, such as 
racial origin, political opinions, religious or other beliefs, and personal data related to 
health or sex life, have additional legal constraints placed on their processing in 
Schedule 3 of the DPA.  
 
Provided they are enshrined in legislation – as is the case with the DPA – and 
rigorously adhered to, these principles can help to provide a considerable level of 
privacy protection. This is especially true where the principles are tailored to the 
context and conditions of particular sectors as, for example, recommended by the 
Lindop Report (Home Office, 1978). However, unless additional principles – such as 
a principle of ‘fair processing’ – are added to the existing list, they are unlikely to be 
sufficient. For example, Pounder (2008) has argued that the current UK data 
protection regime is more concerned with the ‘how’ of data processing than with the 
question of whether processing should take place or not. Further, he argues that 
because the existing regime does not provide regulators with the powers necessary 
to prevent the state from engaging in overzealous surveillance and data collection, 
an additional nine principles are needed. Although one of these new principles deals 
with issues of compensation, for the most part they are aimed at ensuring that the 
state must demonstrate that any new surveillance measure is necessary and 
proportionate, or promoting better parliamentary and regulatory scrutiny of 
government surveillance practices (Pounder, 2008, p. 19). Such principles are central 
to ensuring that the rights contained in Article 8 are properly protected, and that any 
interference with those rights must be in accordance with the law, justified, 
proportionate and necessary.  
 
In contrast to these proposals, the ALRC recommends a principle of ‘notification’ 
requiring ‘organisations to notify individuals or otherwise ensure they are aware of 
particular matters relating to the collection and handling of personal information about 
the individual’ (ALRC, 2008, vol. I, p. 37).58 A related principle is transparency or 
‘openness’, requiring ‘organisations to operate openly and transparently by setting 
out clearly expressed policies on its handling of personal information in a Privacy 
Policy, including how it collects, holds, uses and discloses personal information’ 
ALRC, 2008, vol. I, p. 39). However, experience to date with organisations’ opaque 
and legalistic privacy policies online and elsewhere has been far from encouraging, 
and better approaches to implementing transparency need to be found, perhaps 
including strong information rights or ‘trust’ charters adopted by public agencies 
(Raab, 2003). A third principle is found in the OECD Guidelines but recently 
developed in the international experts’ ‘Galway Project’, and it is also reflected in the 
2009 Madrid Resolution of the International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners, and in the Article 29 Working Party’s contribution to EC 
consultation on the future of privacy’s legal framework. This is the principle of 
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‘accountability’ which, although expressed in terms of ‘companies’, would also apply 
to the public sector; it: 
 
shifts the focus of privacy governance to an organisation’s ability to 
demonstrate its capacity to achieve specific privacy objectives. It involves 
setting privacy protection goals for companies based on criteria 
established in law, self-regulation and best practices, and vesting the 
organisation with both the ability and the responsibility to determine 
appropriate, effective measures to reach those goals. 59 
 
It is debatable whether ‘consent’ should be a further principle in its own right, or 
whether – because it is so difficult to define and apply in practice – it should only play 
a supportive role to the package of other principles. The ALRC considered this 
question following a lengthy consultation process, and concluded that consent should 
not be a discrete privacy principle. It did, however, note that consent ‘plays a key role 
in the application of other privacy principles – namely those regulating the collection 
of sensitive information, use and disclosure, and cross-border data flows’ (ALRC, 
2008, vol. I, p. 686),60 and that it should therefore be the subject of guidance and 
clarification by the regulatory authority. On the other hand, Rule (2007, pp. 195-6) 
has argued that the default position for the public or private sector should be that 
there can be no collection, storage, processing, or sharing of personal data without 
the meaningful and informed consent of the individual concerned, or – in the case of 
the public sector – legislative authorisation. This idea has been adopted by some 
privacy regimes, and has particular rhetorical force in a democracy, where the 
doctrine of ‘the consent of the governed’ has a long-established and foundational 
basis in constitutional theory.  
 
Because this commitment to consent is so frequently set aside for good cause by 
circumstances and necessary information requirements in different sectors (for 
example, in the criminal justice system), and by problems associated with gaining 
‘informed consent’, it is open to question whether such an ‘informational self-
determination’ principle can serve as a robust foundation for the right to privacy.61 In 
addition, the circumstances under which consent is sought (or revoked) vary 
considerably across different sectors. As a result, this is a good example of where a 
general privacy principle needs to be supplemented by particular rules and guidance. 
But regardless of the approach adopted, there also needs to be a fundamental 
rethinking of the role of individual consent as regards personal information, and 
recognition of the fact that privacy – although a right – is in part a function of 
individual and social expectations in specific contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010). There is 
a clear need for a deeper debate about role of consent in privacy protection before a 
satisfactory resolution can be achieved for the UK. 
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In sum, both the data protection principles and the more general privacy principles 
outlined above can play a crucial role in helping to create and shape a framework for 
the effective protection of information privacy rights, and by extension, other rights 
that support but are not directly concerned with information privacy. They give rise to 
general rules, and also specific laws in sectors where there is a need to clearly define 
the relationship between individuals and those who might threaten their privacy 
through the collection and use of their personal data.  
 
The important role that can be played by principles can also be illustrated by 
comparing two basic approaches to privacy law and regulation – what Nissenbaum 
(2010, pp. 237-8) refers to as the omnibus and the sectoral approaches. The 
omnibus approach is based on the assumption that privacy is a fundamental value, 
and can provide a starting point for both the development of general privacy laws and 
regulations as well as the drafting of detailed legislation and the application of 
specific rules.  
 
The sectoral approach is based on the idea that each sector of society needs to take 
a different approach to questions of privacy, and that there is little value in attempting 
to define privacy or explicitly recognise an overarching right to privacy. According to 
this view, reform should be undertaken on a sector-by-sector basis, with different 
privacy laws being introduced for health, law enforcement, communications, and so 
on. It has become commonplace to contrast European ‘comprehensive’ data 
protection legislation with the American ‘sectoral’ patchwork (Gellman, 1993), but this 
is an oversimplification more common to policy rhetoric and does not stand up to 
closer analysis, at least as far as its description of Europe is concerned. 
 
The current UK approach is a hybrid of these two approaches: omnibus and sectoral. 
As has already been argued throughout this report, this mixed approach has not 
worked particularly well in the UK, mainly because many fundamental privacy 
principles have been undermined or obscured as a result of the complexity and 
inconsistency of the current system of legal protections. At present, the protection of 
privacy and the regulation of surveillance and data collection is achieved through a 
haphazard combination of legislative provisions, regulatory guidelines, common law, 
judicial decisions, and other ‘soft law’ instruments. This fragmented approach to 
privacy has a number of serious shortcomings. On the one hand, it makes it difficult 
for both public and private bodies to locate and correctly interpret the relevant law, 
with the result that it is all too easy for these organisations to infringe the public’s 
legitimate and legal expectations of privacy. From the point of view of the individual, it 
also makes it extremely difficult to determine whether or not one has been subjected 
to illegal surveillance or unwarranted data collection, or to establish what, if any, 
remedies are available. Given this, in practice the right to an effective remedy under 
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Article 13 of the European Convention may not be available to the individual. 
Although the enactment of the DPA and the HRA, along with the establishment of the 
Office of the Information Commissioner (ICO), has led to a considerable improvement 
in this situation, the current system of regulation remains complex and opaque. 
Pounder (2008, p. 11) observes that, while government services may be becoming 
more joined up, protection is provided by a disjointed plethora of regulators in the 
field of personal data and surveillance, established under myriad statutory auspices. 
The effectiveness of the principles of openness and accountability is thus diminished, 
and the other main principles are very difficult to enforce even if resources were 
greater than they have been. 
 
A further problem arises from the fact that although the activities of the police and 
other public bodies are regulated, the surveillance activities of private individuals and 
organisations are less well controlled. It can be inferred that the state has a positive 
obligation to take steps, such as putting in place a legal framework of regulatory 
safeguards, to protect individuals’ ECHR rights against interference by others, 
because the activities of private organisations or persons, and not only public bodies, 
can endanger human rights. Although Article 8 of the ECHR provides the basis – 
alongside the existing tort of breach of confidence – for restricting private surveillance 
and protecting individual privacy, the law remains relatively underdeveloped in this 
area. In particular, the application of the law in relation to workplace surveillance is 
unclear, as is that of the law in relation to various forms of computer-based 
surveillance such as spyware. In order to protect privacy rights properly, the private 
and public sectors should have equally effective – and strong – regulations that are 
consistent with one another.  
 
These reasons point to the need to reinforce an omnibus approach incorporating 
principles that overarch disparate rules embedded in the laws of various sectors if we 
are to prevent further fragmentation and confusion. We also need to consider ways of 
improving the architecture of existing provision for privacy protection and ensuring 
the consistency of further regulatory developments. Many futures for privacy 
protection can be envisaged, but it is useful to focus discussion upon a few 
approaches that represent prominent possibilities that can be seen either as 
alternatives or as components to be drawn upon in fashioning an improved regime. 
The first emphasises a single privacy statute; the second, an enhanced privacy right; 
the third argues for more regulatory coherence; and the fourth considers the case for 
an enhanced role for common law. These approaches are presented and assessed 
below. 
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6.3 Approach Two: enhanced protection via legislative reform 
In light of these and other problems associated with the current system of regulation, 
there is an urgent need for legislative reform. This is an approach that has already 
been identified and recommended by others (see House of Lords (2009) for a 
detailed discussion). At the very least, legislative reform could simplify, consolidate 
and reform the DPA and RIPA.  
 
Information privacy is protected by a wide range of laws and regulations in the UK, 
but the current regime suffers from a number of significant weaknesses as shown in 
previous chapters. The law has tended to develop in an irregular and largely sporadic 
fashion, and there are substantial gaps in the information privacy protections offered 
to individual citizens. This is due to the fact that legal reform in this area is typically 
reactive in character, with the law responding to rapid and often unexpected changes 
in both the technological and political landscape of privacy, surveillance, and data 
sharing. 
 
Laws have developed through a combination of case law, legislation, and informal 
attempts at self-regulation. The absence of clearly defined, overarching principles 
means that each piece of legislation, line of judicial precedent, or code of practice 
has to be understood and interpreted within its own specific context. This can make 
the task of determining what rules apply to any given form of surveillance or data 
collection complex and time-consuming, and increases the likelihood that individuals 
will have their privacy infringed or their personal data misused. 
 
 Consolidation and reform of legislation that deals with all aspects of individual 
privacy, data protection, and surveillance in the public and private sectors, could 
more effectively protect the right to privacy enshrined in human rights legislation and  
ensure that each previously separate area of privacy law is organised around a clear 
definition of privacy and a coherent set of rationales for its protection. 
It could help to ensure that all areas of society – the public, government, and the 
private sector – have a clear understanding of the demands of privacy and the limits 
of surveillance and personal data collection. In addition, reform could provide an 
opportunity for lawmakers to develop a definition of privacy that is not only clear and 
comprehensible, but which also provides the basis for a consistent set of principles 
that can be applied across sectors and different types of data collection, processing, 
and sharing.  
 
A second reason for consolidating the existing law  is that it makes the task of 
updating the law more straightforward. Privacy is an area that is deeply affected by 
changes in technology and in practical application. One of the major reasons why UK 
privacy law has become so fragmented is that in the past different parts of the 
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regulatory system have responded with varying degrees of speed to the challenges 
of technological change, or in some case have not responded at all. Consolidation 
could not only make the process of reform and updating the law more 
straightforward, but could also help to ensure that the definition of privacy and the 
principles that govern legal application remain coherent and comprehensible.62  
 
Thirdly, consolidation could aid effective enforcement. Although it might be too much 
to expect any single regulator to take responsibility for the protection of privacy 
across all sectors of society, consolidated legislation that provides the legislative 
authority for a range of regulators – similar to the current UK situation – could not 
only help to minimise overlaps and gaps as regards their respective powers, but also 
help to ensure that those regulators worked together and in concert with one another. 
In addition, it could provide a clear gateway for individual complaints about possible 
violations of privacy, complaints that could then be referred to the appropriate 
Commissioner or office according to a clear division of statutory responsibilities.  
 
 
Although the main focus of this report is on information privacy, it has also 
considered surveillance as it affects other dimensions of privacy, such as privacy of 
communications and behaviour in public spaces. How far the regulation of a wider 
range of surveillance activities should be dealt with under a reform of legislation is a 
matter for further consideration, and beyond the scope of this report. Having said 
this, it seems reasonable to assume that such reforms could address the invasion of 
privacy that occurs as a result of the exercise of ‘stop and search’ powers under 
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, and provide a range of protections against intrusive, 
covert surveillance by the state. In particular, the reforms could incorporate many of 
the protections that are currently contained in RIPA, and provide greater clarity on 
how the requirements of necessity and proportionality are to be understood in the 
context of surveillance by the police and other state authorities.  
 
Reform of the law might additionally give force to the role of technology in the 
protection of privacy, as discussed in Chapter 5. PETs and PbD are, by now, well-
understood ways of protecting privacy through non-legislative means, but they are 
more talked about than implemented. On the other hand, PETs could be mandated 
by statute, or required as a consequence of the promulgation of a new general or  
sectoral legislation. So, too, could PIA as a related administrative and technical 
discipline, as in the USA. 
 
While many of the above advantages can be obtained through consolidation of 
current legislation, and targeted reform, there are issues that may go beyond simple 
consolidation of current legislation and may require wider reform. These merit 
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consideration, but would require further discussion and thought before concrete 
proposals could be made. 
 
As this report has shown, individual privacy is constantly under threat from a variety 
of quarters, as the personal data-gathering and processing capabilities of the public 
and private sectors continue to expand at an ever-increasing rate. Wider reform 
could mark a major shift in the law’s focus on privacy, and represent a serious 
commitment on the part of the government to respecting individual privacy and the 
interests all of us have in our personal data. It could provide individuals with greater 
protection from what has been described as the emerging surveillance society, and 
articulate with the overarching principles. Reform could have the potential to 
transform the way in which we think about the place of privacy in our legal system, 
and the limits of public and private sector surveillance and data collection.  
It could be helpful if wider reform were to set out a series of privacy principles, 
perhaps along the lines of those suggested by the ALRC, and augmented in keeping 
with current thinking. In addition it could provide an opportunity for lawmakers to 
consider whether wider reform  should include such things as:  
 
• a subsidiary right to ‘informational self-determination’ (similar to that which 
currently exists in Germany), related closely to existing norms about consent to 
data collection and further processing, which would give individuals the right to 
decide what information about themselves should be communicated to others and 
under what circumstances 
 
• a subsidiary right to privacy in public spaces, that could provide the basis for the 
regulation of technologies such as public-space CCTV, and 
 
• an explicit recognition of the data protection principles currently contained in the 
DPA, such that those principles as well as others indicated in Approach One 
would be directly enforceable by the courts, as well as via a regulator (who is 
independent and accessible without cost to complainants). 
 
Given the limitations of the current right to privacy contained in the HRA – which can 
only be asserted against the public bodies and those undertaking public functions – it 
is essential that any reform  also apply to the activities of private individuals and 
organisations. Aside from the fact that such a change would address one of the most 
glaring weaknesses in the current approach to privacy in the UK, it would also help to 
ensure that the right is one that can be easily understood by the general public, and 
would clarify the state’s positive obligations to protect the rights contained in Article 8. 
Finally, given some of the issues outlined above in relation to obtaining relief for a 
breach of privacy – whether through the courts, tribunals or regulators – wider reform  
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would enhance access to an effective remedy in accordance with Article 13 of the 
ECHR.  
 
It must be acknowledged that protection of  privacy  confronts limits set by certain 
other well-established rights that are also embedded in human rights legislation. The 
most important of these is the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
ECHR and Schedule 1, Article 10 of the HRA, giving rise to potential exemptions for 
the media. However, the remit of this report precluded the question of the media’s 
inclusion or exemption from legal restrictions with respect to privacy. Whether, and 
how, any wider reform, or an improved protection of privacy rights, would have to 
include the media is an important matter for further consideration. This issue is 
extremely difficult  both on political grounds, and also in view of experiences of 
previous unsuccessful attempts in other jurisdictions to bring the media under the 
control of any privacy law that was perceived to threaten the foundational right to 
freedom of expression, and the importance of freedom of the media in a democratic 
political system.63 
 
Nevertheless, recent UK legal experience is that ‘celebrities’ claims of journalistic and 
photographic invasion of their privacy  has given rise to prominent cases that have 
served to shape jurisprudence in this area. Consideration of changing the regulatory 
system of the media from self-regulation to bringing the media under a wider reform 
or within the scope of other legislated rights could too easily be seen as special 
protection for the wealthy and famous. On the other hand, such privacy legislation  
would then be available for all to use, not just the wealthy or privileged.  
 
A further consideration with regard to privacy reform has to do with the social and 
political value of privacy, rather than its value solely to individuals, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Legal recognition of the non-individual importance of privacy would 
constitute an advance over the current position. This would be especially so if it 
addressed the question of discrimination against social groups and categories found 
in certain information practices and surveillance activities and strengthened the ability 
to exercise other rights (for example, free speech and assembly) without subjection 
to the ‘chilling effect’ of surveillance. This protection is likely to be better provided 
through explicit grounding in privacy principles and law than through the existing 
dispersed array of legal provisions that do not refer to privacy invasion as an element 
in the treatment of individuals or groups.  
 
Bringing about the sort of fundamental shift in our thinking about privacy, or 
necessarily ensuring that individuals and organisations will suddenly begin to take 
privacy seriously is more likely to be achieved by reform of the existing legislation, 
the introduction of a well-coordinated series of legal and extra-legal measures, a 
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continued focus on new and emerging threats to privacy from both the public and 
private sectors, and further consideration of what wider reforms are required. 
 
6.4 Approach Three: improving the current regulatory regime 
Central to this approach is the idea that sector-specific privacy laws are likely to be 
more effective if they are part of an overarching regulatory structure grounded in law 
and based on a clear and coherent set of principles and enforcement mechanisms. 
Approach Three is primarily concerned with the regulatory environment and specific 
privacy laws. However, it is compatible with other approaches insofar as it represents 
an overarching reform that aims to enhance other more ‘localised’ ways of promoting 
and protecting the right to privacy. Returning to Chapter 5, it is based on the idea of 
integrating laws and other means of safeguarding privacy with a view to creating a 
more coherent approach that will foster a symbiotic relationship between ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ law. Such an approach addresses the shortcomings in the current legislative 
and regulatory regimes, and would build upon the many past initiatives through legal 
reform, the imposition of strong codes of practice and guidance, and the promotion of 
technical and organisational change.  
 
Some new legislation might also be desirable.64 For example, there is a clear need 
for existing government databases containing personal information to be placed on a 
statutory footing, as this would help to define their purpose, specify their limits, and 
provide for effective oversight and remedies. However, care must be taken to ensure 
that any new legislation is based on and consistent with existing laws, such as the 
DPA and RIPA. At the same time, if there is little support for consolidating laws into a 
single statute, then various shortcomings with the existing approach to regulation will 
also need to be addressed. If the DPA and RIPA are to remain – and provide the 
basis for future reforms – they must be amended to ensure that they provide better 
protection for Article 8 rights. A comprehensive review of RIPA and other surveillance 
laws would help to ensure that there is a fair, coherent, accountable and accessible 
regime for the regulation of all forms of surveillance. 
 
Regulatory and enforcement initiatives enable a variety of instruments to do the work 
that law by itself, and legal-compliance requirements, cannot achieve. The benefits of 
encouraging and rewarding good practice alongside those of sanctioning non-
compliance should be more fully built into both managerial accountability practice 
and the training of staff at all levels where the handling of personal data is 
concerned. Designing privacy and other values into information systems should be 
encouraged by governments and by information industries, and made an integral part 
of infrastructure procurement processes. 
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In the wider society, working to involve NGOs in both raising public awareness of 
threats to privacy and in the development of policy-making could substantially help to 
further the goal of greater regulatory coherence and effectiveness. It would utilise the 
experience and knowledge of outside bodies that often have a better grasp of issues, 
problems and solutions. Greater emphasis should be placed on increasing public 
understanding and scepticism about what happens to their data, so that pressures 
can be brought to bear to improve legal compliance, everyday information practices, 
and transparency. More attention should be paid by regulators, NGOs, and data-
using organisations themselves to assisting with subject access requests under data 
protection law, the value of which is often underestimated as a mechanism for 
redress as well as a litmus test of the privacy-protective performance of those who 
use personal data.  
 
In addition, the existing system of statutory Commissioners needs to be rationalised. 
Although there are good reasons to take a specialised approach to regulation, 
unfortunately the current system of privacy protections is marred by a confusing 
fragmentation of responsibility and serious disparities in the amount of oversight and 
enforcement provided in different sectors. Whether there should be a single 
regulatory body – a Privacy Commission – that combines the roles of the currently 
separate Information, Surveillance and Interception Commissioners, or the 
continuation of a plural but more tightly coordinated arrangement amongst them, is a 
question about which opinions differ on grounds of effectiveness, political 
pragmatism, and public perception.65 We believe the alternatives should be 
canvassed and the relative value of competing administrative criteria weighed, 
leading towards a proposal for reform. 
 
Under Approach Three, efforts would also be made to enhance the ability of 
regulators to anticipate changes in the personal-data activities of the private and 
public sectors, rather than leaving them simply to react to ongoing developments. By 
enhancing the ability of regulatory agencies like the ICO to apply research on new 
technologies and investigate emerging trends in surveillance and data collection – 
either through increased in-house staffing or the greater use of external advisors – 
the law is less likely to find itself in the position of having to play catch-up or respond 
to dangerous gaps in the protection of privacy. Once again, NGOs could play a 
useful advisory role in this process, as could academic researchers.  
 
6.5 Approach Four: an increased role for the common law 
Any attempt to reform the legislative framework may also have implications for 
existing common law privacy protections. As has already been noted in Section 4, 
the tort of breach of confidence has a long history, and has recently evolved into a 
powerful tool for the protection of individual privacy in the UK. Originally used to 
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protect trade secrets and prevent employees from disclosing sensitive commercial 
information to a company’s rivals, the tort has now expanded to include situations 
involving the unauthorised disclosure of personal information. Of particular note are 
recent developments that have enabled individuals to bring actions for breach of 
confidence, even in the absence of any pre-existing commercial or other relationship 
between the parties. 
 
On the face of it, it appears that current developments in the law of breach of 
confidence are being driven by a desire on the part of the courts to provide more 
protection for privacy interests without going so far as to establish a new tort of 
privacy. Although it is tempting to welcome any expansion in the law of privacy, this 
approach to reform is severely limited in a number of key ways. First and foremost, 
because the courts are unlikely to recognise a general tort of privacy in the absence 
of specific legislation, common law privacy protections are likely to continue to 
develop in an incremental fashion and exacerbate many of the problems identified in 
this report. Given that the law of privacy in the UK is already highly fragmented, there 
is a danger that even well intentioned judicial activism in the area of privacy will only 
make matters worse. In addition, there is also a risk that judicial activism may lead to 
further disparities between the level of privacy protection enjoyed by citizens in 
different parts of the UK, as decisions of the English courts do not bind their 
counterparts in Scotland or Northern Ireland. Finally, because going to court is 
typically expensive and time consuming, it can be argued that common law privacy 
protections are only likely to be used by the wealthy, and widen the distinction 
between privacy haves and have-nots.  
 
It is for these reasons that this report, while not wishing to underplay the importance 
of the courts and the role of the judiciary in the development of privacy law in the UK, 
does not view common law as an appropriate vehicle for the sort of fundamental 
reform that is currently needed. Even if there was an appetite for the creation of a 
free-standing tort of privacy, it is not clear how such a tort would operate in 
conjunction with existing regulatory structures, or how it would bring coherence to the 
law of privacy more generally. As such, the authors of this report believe that 
common law reform should only be pursued as a very limited strategy.  
 
6.6 Choosing a new path for privacy 
Not all threats to information privacy are of the same severity or likelihood, and there 
are differences between the sources of the threats as well, in terms of the forms of 
surveillance and information processing they represent. Not all domains of life – 
whether shopping, transacting with the state, engaging in financial relationships, 
walking in public streets, or maintaining our health – generate the same patterns of 
risk or affect all individuals or social groups to the same extent. Therefore, it need not 
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be the case that ‘one size fits all’ with regard to the approaches to be put into effect 
towards better privacy protection. However, it seems necessary to articulate a 
common set of principles underlying them – as we have shown – and to ensure that 
an array of privacy-protecting laws and instruments does not amount simply to an ad 
hoc assembly of parts that are confusing to the public and cumbersome in practice.  
 
Any ‘new path’ based on the approaches outlined in this section must be anchored in 
human rights, and in particular the fundamental right to privacy and an appreciation 
of its importance to the kind of society in which we wish to live. It must also adhere to 
certain procedural requirements or principles as well. Among these, the scrutiny, 
transparency and accountability of the processes giving rise to the need for privacy 
protection are especially important. Of similar importance is the accessibility to the 
individual, or to those who act on behalf of individuals – perhaps aggregating their 
individual interests into collective ones – of the legal and other remedies or the 
preventative measures that together constitute the path. Some approaches meet 
these fundamental and procedural requirements better than others, but all must be 
evaluated in terms of how well they are likely to perform as a new path. But it is one 
thing to discern a path; it is another to assess how, at what pace, and who should 
traverse it. 
 
‘Choosing a new path’ implies a selection process, involving organisations that 
design the means for processing personal data; public bodies that engage in 
personal data processing and other forms of surveillance; organisations that 
represent individuals’ interests; and individual actors themselves. All these actors 
should participate in evaluating the approaches and designing the path. In the UK, 
this points towards those involved in the political and legal systems: government and 
parliament, regulatory, law-enforcement, and other agencies, pressure groups and 
NGOs, the media, and the general public. It also presupposes the contribution that 
other interests make: businesses of all kinds, and technological industries. What the 
process should look like, ensuring the involvement of disparate actors, is crucial to a 
successful outcome – the path that is chosen. This question will be considered in 
Chapter 7. 
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7.  Proposals for reform 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Throughout this report, we have considered many different ways of thinking about 
information privacy and how it should be promoted and protected. Chapters One and 
Two examined the threats posed to information privacy by advances in technology, 
as well as some of the dangers associated with greater levels of state surveillance, 
data collection, and information sharing. Chapter 3 explained why information privacy 
matters, and looked at a number of different justifications of privacy with a view to 
clarifying the value of privacy and why it deserves to be protected. In addition, that 
Chapter considered the relationship between privacy and state interests, both now 
and in future. Chapters Four and Five surveyed the landscape of domestic and 
international privacy law, and considered other means by which information privacy 
may be protected within a framework of human rights and with respect to general 
privacy principles. Finally, the previous Chapter outlined several approaches to 
privacy reform that aim to build on principles, existing privacy rights, and legal 
frameworks, while also promoting greater regulatory coherence and increased co-
ordination amongst those responsible for protecting information privacy. These 
approaches are also intended to provide a structure for thinking about how different 
types of reform might be pursued simultaneously, and to help policymakers identify 
exactly what is at stake when considering the potential costs and benefits of any new 
information technology or state surveillance practice. 
 
In this Chapter, we set out a number of recommendations that could provide the 
basis for a fundamental reform of the way in which information privacy is understood 
and protected in the UK. Although it is tempting to compile a long list of sector-
specific reforms and legislative amendments, we believe that such a list would be 
both premature and of limited use. As has been noted throughout, the protection of 
information privacy has often been hampered by piecemeal efforts at reform and the 
lack of a clear rationale. In addition, given that the HRA has established a system of 
rights protections in the UK, it is important to ensure that any privacy reform 
enhances the existing Article 8 jurisprudence.  
 
With this in mind, this Chapter makes a number of broad recommendations that are 
intended to provide the starting point for a more extensive and detailed programme of 
privacy reform. It aims to help clear a new path for privacy, one that is sensitive to the 
broad range of interests concerned, and yet firmly rooted in a commitment to 
fundamental human rights and an awareness of the relationship between the 
individual and the state. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
 Recommendation One: the need for privacy principles  
In the view of the authors of this report, the single greatest stumbling block to the 
effective regulation of information privacy in the UK is the lack of a coherent legal 
framework for the protection and promotion of individual privacy. As a result, this 
report strongly recommends that any proposed programme of reform must be guided 
by a clear set of uniform principles, and an overarching commitment to fundamental 
human rights. New privacy protections must not only be compliant with the demands 
of the HRA, but also strengthen the right to respect for private and family life 
enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
If information privacy protection is to benefit from new thinking, it is important to 
ground change in a (re)statement of overarching principles, as has been shown in 
Chapter 6. These principles should be at a high level but avoid unnecessary 
abstraction, keeping in mind that they must be implemented through specific 
practices and rules, and that regulation based on principles does not necessarily 
avoid problems of trust, enforcement, interpretation, and other kinds. We have 
outlined the conventional data protection principles as a starting point, and at present 
a considerable body of legislation and practice is based upon these principles. It is 
important to note, however, that these principles and practices have limitations when 
applied to new forms of surveillance that may affect information privacy, but do not 
necessarily involve the computerised storage of information or the processing of 
identifiable personal data. New strategies must continually be developed to cope with 
the increasingly novel ways in which privacy, including information privacy, is at risk. 
Extending the existing inventory of principles will help to cover new situations and 
clarify responsibilities in the relationship between individuals and the state. In 
particular, it is important to revisit the principle of consent and possibly reconsider its 
position as a foundational principle. As it stands, its status in theory is uncertain, and 
its realisation in practice is often treated as either impossible or optional.  
 
We therefore recommend that the principles for information privacy protection be 
restated clearly, with a view to reaffirming the existing data protection principles 
within an Article 8 human rights framework, and also emphasising the importance of 
lawfulness, accountability, transparency and effective remedy. The principle of 
consent should be reformulated, having particular regard to the situations in which it 
would be valuable, and to the ways it could be implemented. The principles would 
benefit from discussion and debate by a short-term forum drawn largely from the 
world of law and academia. This forum would aim to restate and develop a body of 
principles that could realistically be applied to the varied contexts in which privacy is 
likely to be at stake in the UK in future. It would also examine ways in which the 
difficulties and paradoxes of ‘principles-based regulation’ can be handled.  
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Recommendation Two: strengthening the right to privacy through legislative 
reform 
It is important to reinforce the existing right to privacy.  The government should 
consider reforming existing legislation that touches on matters of privacy in order to 
ensure that it is consistent with the privacy principles recommended earlier, and that 
it enhances – rather than undermines – the existing provisions of the HRA. At 
minimum, such reform should consolidate and improve the existing RIPA and data 
protection regimes in relation to information privacy and surveillance, and will need to 
take into account, and incorporate any legislative changes required as a result of the 
proposed new EU data protection legislative regime. In addition, courts should be 
given additional powers – via appropriate statutory amendments – to directly enforce 
existing data protection regulations and other privacy principles.  
 
It would be desirable if an appropriate legal body or commission undertook an 
investigation of how existing privacy rights could be reinforced, especially through the 
revision, simplification, and further development of statutory law. This investigation 
should engage a wide range of interests and draw on the expertise of specialists in 
the fields of law, technology, and social science. 
 
Recommendation Three: promoting greater regulatory coherence 
Any system of regulation must be based on law. As discussed earlier in this report, 
there are significant gaps in the current legal regime, and in particular in the system 
of protection established by RIPA and DPA. We recommend that a comprehensive 
review of the DPA, RIPA, and other surveillance laws should be undertaken to 
ensure that the regulatory regime governing state surveillance is fair, coherent, 
accountable, and accessible. In addition, all government databases that hold 
personal information should be placed on a statutory footing, with specific provisions 
regulating their remit, oversight and the provision of individual remedies. 
  
The fragmented and un-coordinated system of regulatory Commissioners has been 
commented upon earlier in this report. At present, there is a clear need for reforms 
that will bring about greater coherence and clarity to the existing system of regulation 
around information privacy. This could be achieved in one of three ways: through a 
reallocation of powers amongst the existing agencies, by bringing them into one 
system, or through closer co-ordination between Commissioners. Implementation of 
privacy laws would also be facilitated if a more anticipatory and proactive approach to 
regulation, based on knowledge and understanding of trends in technology and 
surveillance, were encouraged in place of a largely reactive set of practices.  
 
We therefore recommend that greater regulatory coherence should be a key priority 
for any future agenda of privacy reform. As a first step we recommend that a group of 
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experts drawn from the public sector, parliament, NGOs and academia be convened 
to consider the alternative ways of improving coherence. The aim of this group would 
be to develop the terms of the enquiry, and develop alternative regulatory models 
that could then be examined in detail by parliament. Ultimately, we would hope that 
this process would produce a series of legislative amendments and ministerial orders 
that could rationalise the existing system of regulators, and thereby improve the level 
of protection currently afforded to information privacy.  
 
Recommendation Four: improved technological and organisational means of 
protection 
The need for better integration between legal and non-legal means of protecting 
information privacy was emphasised earlier. Achieving this goal depends on 
developing ways of encouraging the design and use of privacy-protective 
technologies, assessing the impact of new information systems on privacy, 
encouraging stronger accountability practices in organisations, and involving NGOs 
in the protection and promotion of privacy. Although such measures have been 
widely discussed in recent years, there is a clear need for a more structured 
approach to the development of technological and other non-legal privacy protections 
if information privacy is to be safeguarded against future threats.  
 
We therefore recommend that the government take steps to encourage the 
development and use of technological and other non-legal solutions to the problem of 
information privacy, and that where appropriate, the use of such measures should be 
required by law. In addition, we recommend that greater effort be made to help 
NGOs and the private sector develop and implement creative approaches to the 
protection of privacy, and that the government consider funding public education 
programmes aimed at making individuals more aware of the threats to privacy and 
the practical ways in which they can protect their own personal information. 
 
We also recommend that information technology developers be encouraged to 
incorporate privacy protections into their product designs, and that the government 
should make the inclusion of such protections a contractual requirement when 
dealing with private sector contractors. In addition, the education and training of 
information technology professionals should be reformed to ensure that the 
designers and manufacturers of potentially privacy-intrusive products have an 
understanding of privacy and data protection principles and their relation to human 
rights. This reform is a matter that the relevant technology professional associations, 
educators, and the Information Commissioner should be encouraged to undertake in 
concert. 
Technological solutions, however, require appropriate organisational and ‘cultural’ 
safeguards to be put in place. Although it is clear that central government has begun 
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to learn some of the lessons arising out of the data losses suffered by HMRC and 
other departments in recent years, these reforms need to be more widespread. As a 
result, we recommend that the government establish a central taskforce responsible 
for ensuring that improvements in information handling are properly publicised 
throughout government, with a view to establishing a consistent set of best practices 
across departments and state agencies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
79 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Information privacy plays an essential role in our society. As this report has shown, 
the right to information privacy is currently under threat in the UK, and is likely to be 
faced with further challenges if central and local government continue to expand the 
surveillance apparatus of the state. While some forms of surveillance are clearly 
beneficial to both individuals and society at large, it is vital to ensure that information 
privacy is properly protected through the effective regulation of government 
surveillance, including data gathering, processing, and sharing.  
 
In an effort to build on recent government, NGO, and private sector initiatives, this 
report has considered how the right to information privacy could be strengthened 
through various legal and non-legal reforms. In addition to emphasising the need for 
a comprehensive review of existing privacy laws and the regulation of surveillance, 
the report has also acknowledged the importance of ensuring that any programme of 
reform is consistent with the existing constitutional settlement between the different 
jurisdictions of the UK. Finally, the report has shown that there are important 
international dimensions of privacy that must be taken into account when thinking 
about the future of privacy protection in the UK. 
 
At the heart of the report is a commitment to the idea that information privacy is a 
fundamental right, and that the legal framework that seeks to protect it must be 
capable of responding to new technologies and changes in the ways in which we 
understand and communicate personal information. If we are to develop privacy laws 
that will stand the test of time, we must begin to think carefully about why privacy 
matters and acknowledge the need for a coherent, comprehensive, and robust 
approach to its protection. As this report has shown, the right to privacy is at risk of 
being eroded by the growing demand for information by government and the private 
sector. Unless we start to reform the law and build a regulatory system capable of 
protecting information privacy, we may soon find that it is a thing of the past. 
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